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STONE V. POWELL: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
EXCLUSIONARY RULE, FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS AND THE FULL AND FAIR STANDARD
INTRODUCTION

The exclusionary rule is a principle of judicial self-restraint formulated to enforce the fourth amendment. It is perhaps modern
society's most trying test of commitment to constitutional tenets.
Ever-increasing crime rates make it extremely difficult to justify
the rule's exclusion of reliable and often critical evidence from a
criminal trial solely on the basis of the broad and pliant language of
the fourth amendment.' The exclusion of relevant evidence at the
trial level often results in an acquittal for lack of proof. Even assuming that evidence clears this first hurdle and is admitted by the trial
court, an equally onerous result may be the reversal of conviction on
direct appeal because of the prejudicial consideration of unconstitutionally obtained evidence. Critics of the rule urge that society as a
whole should not be penalized for the mistakes or abuses of a few
law enforcement officials.
When the exclusionary rule is first given effect on federal
habeas corpus review of a state judgment, justification is particularly troublesome because the social costs of applying the rule are aggravated by the finding of prejudicial constitutional error. The mere
availability of federal habeas corpus to state prisoners is, according
to its opponents, contrary to the notion of state sovereignty.2
Despite the state adjudication of a prisoner's consititutional claim,
he may still collaterally attack the validity of that state conviction
on federal habeas corpus if he has exhausted all other state
remedies. Not only does this reflect a basic mistrust of state court
systems, critics continue, but also the assumption that federal courts
are better qualified to decide constitutional issues.' When a state
prisoner asserts by federal habeas corpus a violation of his fourth
amendment rights predicated upon the trial court's admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence, the tension between federal and
1. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
2. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 263-66 (1973) (Powell,
J., concurring).
3. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 n.35 (1976).
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state court systems is greatest, and the cooperation between them
at its least.
Despite drawbacks, the exclusionary rule and federal habeas
corpus were explicitly formulated to serve a variety of social values.
Although the efficacy of both devices to accomplish such values is
sometimes subject to dispute there can be no doubt as to the importance of their objectives. When the exclusionary rule and federal
habeas corpus are utilized by a state prisoner in a collateral attack
on a state judgment their joint function is to protect individual
citizens from unwarranted intrusions of personal privacy deemed
reprehensible to a free society. Proposals to restrict the availability
of this form of judicial relief must, in face of such a fundamental objective, clearly demonstrate its ineffectiveness or pose a workable
alternative. Conventional notions of social values such
as the
reliability of the guilt-determining process and the interests of
federalism, it is submitted, should not take precedence over this constitutional purpose absent a showing of such inefficiency.'
Growing dissatisfaction with the effect that both federal habeas
corpus for state prisoners and the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule have upon the adequacy and finality of state adjudications5
culminated this past term in the decision of Stone v. PowelL Proponents of expansive state authority have long perceived the
modern convergence of political power in the federal government as
violative of the reserve clause of the tenth amendment. Federal
habeas corpus relief for state prisoners can be regarded as yet
another infringement of the sovereign state's right to govern its
citizens without federal interference. Stone is a decision following

4. It may ultimately be shown that permitting a federal habeas corpus
remedy after an abortive state proceeding may jeopardize some goals more desirable
than the vindication of the constitutional rights of state prisioners. Since forfeiture of
constitutional rights is at stake, such goals ought to be unmistakably clear, and it must
be satisfactorily demonstrated that they are attainable only through the sacifice of constitutional guarantees. But until goals of this nature evolve out of the process of
analysis, it does not seem appropriate, in light of the problems and purposes thus far
exposed, to permit forfeiture of the right to seek federal habeas corpus relief merely
because of an abortive state proceeding. Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of An
Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1315, 1373 (1961). Cf. Bivens v. Six
Unknown Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971) (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
5. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 231 (Black, J., dissenting); Bivens
v. Six Unknown Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
Schneckloth b. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
6. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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the recent pattern of cases expressing revitalized concern for the
role that states should play in our federal system of government.!
Mr. Justice Powell, who wrote the majority opinion in Stone v.
Powell began with the premise that the federal remedy of habeas
corpus is only available to vindicate infringements of constitutional
rights The exclusionary rule itself was not considered a constitutional guarantee by the Stone majority but only a "judicially created
means of effectuating the rights secured by the fourth amendment."'
The exclusionary rule must, therefore, justify its continued existence and application by incurring on balance more social benefits
than detriments. Although "the primary justification for the exclusionary rule . . . is the deterrence of police conduct that violates
fourth amendment rights,""0 available statistical evidence on the
deterrent effect of the rule is inconclusive at best.'1 Furthermore,
the social cost of excluding "typically reliable and often the most
probative information bearing on the-guilt or innocence of the defendant" is extremely burdensome. Additional resources must then be
expended not only to duplicate judicial effort but also to investigate
alternative sources of proof that oftentimes are less reliable and
probative than the illegally obtained evidence excluded by the rule.
Therefore, the majority in Stone comes down on the side of conditioning the impact of the exclusionary rule when used by a state
prisoner as the basis for a federal writ of habeas corpus. With this
in mind Justice Powell concluded:
Where the State has provided an opportunity for full and
fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim,' 3 a state
prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief
on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial. In this
context the contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any,
to the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment is minimal,
7. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, __
U.S. __
, 97 S.Ct. 2497 (1977);
Juidice v. Vail, __
U.S. __
, 97 S.Ct. 1211 (1977); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592
(1975); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 322 (1975); Preiser v. Rodrequez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973);
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
8. 428 U.S. 465, 475-81 (1976).
9. Id at 482.
10. Id. at 486.
11. Id at 492 n.32.
12. Id at 490.
13. See discussion at 125.
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and the substantial societal costs of application of the rule
persist with special force.1'
The argument of Stone against the exclusionary rule in federal
habeas review of state judgments is two-pronged. First, the constitutional basis of the rule is disparaged by emphasizing its deterrent function to the exclusion of other historically recognized purposes. Then the social costs resulting from application of the rule on
federal habeas corpus are weighed against the diminished benefit
still inhering in the exclusion of unconstitutional evidence. The first
part of the Stone argument is directed at the exclusionary rule itself
whereas the latter section deals with the effects of the rule upon
society when collaterally enforced in the federal system.
A consideration of the Stone v. Powell argument within a
historical context reveals a variety of purposes underlying the exclusionary rule other than deterrence, which continue to justify its
application not only on trial or appellate levels but also on federal
habeas review of state judgments. This is contrary to the impression conveyed by statements in Stone. Each purpose serves to
achieve the objectives of the fourth amendment in a different way.
The "imperative of judicial integrity" purpose, one of the first traditionally recognized, is directed at preserving respect and public confidence in government as a whole by restraining unlawful excesses
of the enforcement branch of government. The protection of personal constitutional rights, another original justification for the rule,
operates to insulate the individual subjected to an unreasonable
search and seizure from further encroachments upon his right to
privacy. The deterrent function of the rule emphasized in Stone is
aimed at preventing future fourth amendment violations by "removing the incentive to disregard"' 5 the constitutional guarantee,
although the effectiveness of this general deterrence is subject to
serious dispute. Whatever police deterrence does exist, however,
depends upon the practical effects of the rule upon law enforcement,
not the proximity of its judicial employment. Closely related to the
function of deterrence is a less discernible purpose of the exclusionary rule, the educative effect also mentioned in the Stone majority opinion."' Whereas deterrence largely depends upon negative
reinforcement, the educative purpose of the rule acts in a positive
manner to instill constitutional values and belief systems in law enforcement officials.
14.
15.
16.

428 U.S. at 494-95.
Id. at 492.
IM at 493.
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Although Stone v. Powell correctly characterizes the exclusionary rule as a "judicially created remedy," this does not
necessarily deny the constitutional dimensions of the rule. As the
only practical means presently available to effectuate the prohibition of the fourth amendment, the exclusionary rule assumes a more
integral and critical role than that normally occupied by a judicial
evidentiary rule. Therefore, it deserves the same judicial recognition and protection as the fourth amendment itself.
The prohibition of federal habeas relief in Stone is prefaced by
a note-worthy condition that requires the state to provide "an opportunity for a full and fair litigation" of the defendant's fourth amendment claim. This prerequisite is important because it furnishes the
only means to evade the broad proscription of Stone. However, the
interpretation of the phrase is difficult to ascertain within that context, since at least three alternative meanings are possible. The first
interpretation is predicated on the general criteria established in
Townsend v. Sain,7 the second on a restrictive notion of federal
habeas review, and the third interpretation on the procedural adequacy of the state judicial system. The last interpretation is most
compelling although its effect is inconsistent with prior opinions,
such as Fay v. Noia.2
MOTIVATIONAL BACKGROUND OF STONE V. POWELL

What is perhaps more perplexing than the practical effect of
Stone v. Powell is the underlying motivation behind the decision.
The prognosis of the both the exclusionary rule and/or federal
habeas review of state convictions depends to a large extent upon
the objective(s) towards which the Stone majority focused its attention. Keeping in mind the possibility that various justices may join
an opinion for different reasons and the inevitable limitations that
accompany any inquiry into motivations, several viable perspectives
are suggested below as the principal interpretations of Stone.
The most obvious explanation for the Stone decision is a conscious rejection of the Kaufman v. United States1" rationale and
adoption of Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion in the same case,
a perspective that was subsequently re-echoed by Mr. Justice
Powell's concurrence in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.3 Inasmuch as
17.
18.
19.
20.

372
372
394
412

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

293
391
217
218

(1963).
(1969).
(1969).
(1973).
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Mr. Justice Powell was also the author of Stone, one would
reasonably expect to find some similarity between the KaufmanSchneckloth minority rationales and this most recent expression.
These earlier opinions were premised upon the categorization of constitutional rights according to their effect upon the integrity of the
guilt-determination process.2 1 In other words, since the admission of
illegally obtained evidence does not taint the reliability of the finding of guilt, unlike other constitutional guarantees such as the
sixth amendment right to counsel, a state conviction should not be
reversed on federal habeas corpus merely because such evidence
was not excluded by the trial or appellate courts. This perspective
rests on the belief that it is appropriate to classify constitutional
guarantees by the practical consequences they produce, and furthermore, that such distinctions are a legitimate reason for conditioning
their use.
Another presumption underlying these earlier opinions was
that a state judgment should not be disturbed by federal courts on
habeas review unless the incarceration was unjust.' Injustice within
this context, however was interpreted as factual innocence and did
not encompass the privacy interest of the state prisoner. Inasmuch
as the fourth amendment right "against unreasonable searches and
seizures" was considered immaterial to the factual question of guilt,
the state applicant for federal habeas relief could not be unjustly
confined on that account. This line of argument was additionally buttresed by a restrictive definition of judgment finality and by a
liberalized notion of comity, both of which were aimed at restraining
federal habeas review of state convictions.'
If Mr. Justice Brennan is accurate in his assessment of Stone v.
Powel4 then the case could indeed be regarded as merely a continuation of the Kaufman-Schneckloth trend, the only difference being the majority status of the argument in Stone. In his dissent to
the holding, he contended that these previous minority expressions
21.
It is this element of probable or possible innocence that I think
should be given weight in determining whether a judgment after conviction and appeal and affirmance should be open to collateral attack, for the
great historic role or the writ of habeas corpus has been to insure the
reliability of the guilt-determing process.
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. at 234 (Black, J., dissenting). See also Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 257-58 (Powell, J., concurring); Thornton v. United States,
125 U.S. App. D.C. 114, 368 F.2d 822 (1966).
22. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 257-58 (Powell, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 256-57 (Powell, J., concurring).
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were still the operative reasons behind the Stone decision, under
the pretense of interpreting the Consititution. 2' Assuming for now
that the above characterization of the reasons motivating the Stone
majority is correct, the question then arises whether only fourth
amendment claims are thus to be denied habeas relief or whether all
"non-guilt-related" constitutional rights will eventually be so
restricted too. Responding to this query, Mr. Justice Brennan
answered
that the groundwork is being laid today in Stone for a
drastic withdrawal of federal habeas jurisdiction, if not for
all grounds of alleged unconstitutional detention, then at
least for claims-for example, of double jeopardy, entrapment, self-incrimination, Miranda violations, and use of invalid identification procedures-that this Court later
decides are not "guilt-related. ' 5
Certainly, no theoretical obstacle prevents extension of the Stone
argument to any judicial rule that is procedural or enabling in
nature rather than substantive, even though the likelihood of such
additional encroachments into federal habeas jurisdication probably
depends more upon judicial dissatisfaction with the particular constitutional principle involved than its guilt reliability.
Another possible motivation for the Stone decision is simply
the afore-mentioned discontent with the exclusionary rule, especially
as applied to state convictions by Mapp v. Ohio.' The evolution of
the rule since Mapp has largely been a series of exceptions to the
principle of exclusion." To a certain extent, this pattern is inevitable
24. [Tlhe real ground of today's decision . . . would read the federal
habeas corpus statutes as requiring the District Courts rountinely to deny
habeas relief to state prisioners . . . because such claims are "different in
kind" from other constitutional violations in that they "do not 'impugn the
integrity of the fact-finding process'" . . . and because application of such
constitutional strictures "often frees the guilty." . . . Much in the Court's
opinion suggests that a construction of the habeas statutes to deny relief
for non- "guilt-related" constitutional violations, based on this Court's
vague notions of comity and federalism . . . is the actual premise for
today's decision. . . . We are told that federal determination of Fourth
Amendment claims merely involves "an issue that has no bearing on the
basic justice of the defendant's incarceraton," . . . and that "ultimate question in the criminal process should invariably be guilt or innocence."
412 U.S. at 515-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 517-18.
26. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975);
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after the announcement of a general legal precept with little or no
qualification made applicable to new circumstances. The pertinent
question then is whether these restrictions upon the scope of the
rule may be symptomatic of a trend culminating in the complete
overruling of Mapp or whether they merely represent a fine tuning
of the exclusion principle. When the Stone decision is considered in
conjunction with Calandra v. United States," a related opinion also
written by Mr. Justice Powell that prohibited a grand jury witness
from refusing to answer questions derived from evidence obtained
in an unlawful search and seizure, it would appear that the rule's applications is being eaten away from opposite ends of the criminal
legal system. These recent developments might well be construed as
the beginning of the end for the exclusionary principle as more and
more applications are excluded from its effective scope.
Mr. Justice Brennan argued in his dissent that Mapp was
radically reinterpreted by the Stone holding but never explicitly
overruled. Since the majority opinion also professed adherence to
the earlier case, there is little doubt that it survived Stone. Chief
Justice Burger's persistent displeasure with the exclusionary rule as
reflected in his separate concurrence to Stone" also indicates the
continued efficacy of the judicial principle. His and other critic's
disaffection with Mapp apparently stems from a fundamental quarrel over the propriety of the exclusionary rule within any context,
not just federal habeas corpus. Once again, if limiting the scope of
the exclusionary rule was the motivation behind Stone v. Powel,
then the issue that remains unsettled is to what extent the rule, as
applied by Mapp, endures.
An analogous explanation for the Stone decision could be
dissatisfaction with the scope of federal habeas corpus as interpreted by the Brown-Noia-Townsend' trilogy. Each of these cases
either removed restrictions upon the availability of federal habeas
review or broadly construed it's application. This expanded role further encroached upon the judicial authority of the states by subjecUnited States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165 (1969); Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968);
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). Cf. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967);
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966);
Tehan v. United States ex. rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
28. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
29. 428 U.S. at 496.
30. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963);
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
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ting more of their convictions to federal scrutiny at even earlier
stages of development. However, recent holdings of the Supreme
Court have demonstrated a growing accomodation to state interests
of finality and autonomy as legitimate factors to be taken into account when re-examining the judgment of a state court. 1 This principle of self-restraint, broadly termed federalism or comity, has
become a threshold obstacle to scale whenever a federal court is requested to review the propriety of state action, especially when the
requested relief is injunctive in nature." This is also particularly
relevant in the criminal domain, since that area is traditionally
regarded as a local concern.' The deference accorded states in
criminal matters by such decisions may now be extended by Stone
to federal habeas review of state convictions as well, thereby narrowing its scope and tacitly braking the liberalizing objective(s) of
the abovesaid opinions. The relevant question still remaining,
however, is to what extent federal habeas review of state convictions will be limited by Stone. If taken at face value, the decision appears to apply only to fourth amendment claims that have not been
"fully and fairly litigated" at the state level. But as noted earlier,
the rationale adopted by the Stone majority might also be applicable
to other non-guilt-related constitutional guarantees. Furthermore,
the "full and fair" terminology utilized by the Court leaves room in
which to maneuver due to the ambiguity of the phrase.
A final possible motivation underlying Stone v. Powell, upon
which this note proceeds, is the combined dissatisfaction with both
the exclusionary rule and federal habeas review of state convictions.
From this standpoint, the decision may not presage any further
restraints upon other constitutional rights of state prisoners when
asserted on federal habeas corpus. Rather, discontent with the exclusionary rule and growing accomodation to state interest may
have coalesced in the case to produce a result peculiar to those circumstances. Such an interpretation would not, of course, prevent
further restrictions upon the fourth amendment or federal habeas
relief respectively. Subsequent decisions, to be remarked on later,
suggest that this may indeed be the most appropriate construction
to place upon Stone.
31. See note 7 supra.
32. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420
U.S. 592 (1975); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66
(1971); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
33. See, e.g., Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975); Samuels v. Mackell, 401
U.S. 66 (1971); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1977

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 [1977], Art. 4

100

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12

PURPOSES UNDERLYING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

Central to an analysis of Stone v. Powell is a consideration of
the purposes underlying the exclusionary rule. Historically, the exclusionary rule has been regarded as a device with a variety of purposes, but the deterrent function of the rule has emerged preeminent as of late.' Justice Powell is one of those who places
primary emphasis on the deterrent function.
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule then is
the deterrence of police conduct that violates Fourth
Amendment rights. Post-Mapp decisions have established
that the rule is not a personal constitutional right. It is
not calculated to redress the injury to the privacy of the
victim of the search or seizure, for any "[r]eparation
comes too late."" Instead, "the rule is a judicially created
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
generally through its deterrent effect.'"
This statement is the heart of the Stone argument.
If the primary purpose for the exclusionary rule is the deterrence of fourth amendment violations by enforcement officials, then
objective evidence rebutting the efficacy of the deterrent function
lends credence to the Stone argument against the reconsideration of
fourth amendment claims on federal habeas corpus. Deterrence has
undoubtedly played a role in the development of the exclusionary
rule, especially in those cases which "qualified" the scope of the
rule's application." Prior decisions have not, however, limited
justification of the exclusionary rule solely to its deterrent objective.
The "Imperative Of Judicial Integrity"
The exclusionary rule effectuates the guarantees of the fourth
amendment through a variety of avenues. Stone v. Powell focused
upon that aspect of the rule which discourages the actual physical
intrusion into one's home or effects. Yet, there can be no doubt that
the exclusionary rule was also designed to "deter" the judicial
recognition of unconstitutionally obtained evidence. This form of
34. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976); Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, (1974); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974). Cf.
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536-39 (1975).
35. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965).
36. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486. (1976).
37. See notes 78 & 85 infra and accompanying text.
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judicial self-restraint has been historically characterized as the
M
"imperative of judicial integrity.""
This expression signifies that
courts should not sanction conduct that is unconstitutional, since
they are charged with the duty of supporting and executing the
Constitution as supreme law of the land." The social value gained by
compliance with this self-imposed "deterrence" is public trust and
confidence in a judicial system dedicated to the principles upon
which a free society rests.'
The exclusionary rule was originally given tacit recognition in
Boyd v. United States." The case centered around a court order
directing the defendants to produce the invoices of certain merchandise suspected of being subject to import duties. The defendants
successfully argued that the compelled production of selfincriminating evidence was unconstitutional and void. Mr. Justice
Bradley, writing for the majority, relied on the judicial integrity
argument when he pointed out the traditional rule never to compel
evidence from a party which might tend to convict that individual of
38.
The rule also serves another vital function-"the imperative
of judicial integrity." . ..Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot
and will not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional
rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits
of such invasions.
392 U.S. at 12-13.
39.
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the
country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures ... should find
no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times
with the support of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions
have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights.
***

This protection is equally extended to the action of the government and
officers of the law acting under it. . . . To sanction such proceedings
would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect, if not an open
defiance, of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against such unauthorized action.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92, 394 (1914).
40.
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be
imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is
the potent, omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a
law unto himself; it invites anarchy.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
41. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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a crime. He characterized such practices as "abhorrent" and "contrary to the principles of a free government."' 2 The trial admission
of self-incriminating evidence "may suit the purposes of despotic
power, but it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty
and personal freedom."'" Boyd stressed the intimate relationship
between the fourth and fifth amendments as a primary factor in prohibiting the use of illegal evidence, a connection which has not met
with recent adherence." An important aspect of the Boyd decision is
the absence of any discussion concerning a deterrent effect.
There was likewise no mention of the deterrent function in
Weeks v. United States,'5 the first case directly confronting the exclusionary rule. Various papers and articles" of the defendant were
seized in a warrantless search of his premises and introduced as incriminating evidence at trial. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction following the analysis developed in the Boyd opinion.
Nowhere is the judicial integrity purpose of the rule more succinctly
expressed than when that Court said:
To sanction such [police conduct] would be to affirm by
judicial decision a manifest neglect, if not an open defiance, of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for
the protection of the people against such unauthorized action. . . . The efforts of the courts and their officials to
42. Id. at 632.
43. Id.
44. Mr. Justice Black, in his concurrence to the Mapp decision, 367 U.S. at
661-66, was probably the last member of the Supreme Court to accept the interrelationship between the fourth and fifth amendments as a justificaion for the exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence, despite ample support for such a proposition in the early
cases recognizing the exclusionary rule. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 630, 633;
Bramm v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 544 (1897). Recent opinions remain unsympathetic to the fourth-fifth amendent relationship theory, Bivens v. Six Unknown
Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 414 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), although Justice Black
continued to assert its application periodically.
For a discussion relating to the application of both the fourth and fifth
amendments to the privacy of personal papers, see Note, Papers, Privacy and the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments: A Constitutional Analysis, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 626
(1974).
45. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
46. The Boyd Court drew a distinction between private papers or documents
that were communicative in nature and articles or objects that were not in themselves
expressive of any self-incriminating information. 116 U.S. 623. This distinction probably explains the early reliance upon the fifth amendment as another reason for the
exclusion of illegally seized evidence. See note 45 supra and accompanying text. The
Weeks Court seems to have considered only the relevance of the fourth amendment,
232 U.S. at 389.
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bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are,
are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering
which have resulted 7in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.'

The Weeks majority characterized the exclusion of unlawful
evidence as so essential to the protection of the fourth amendment
that without such a judicial prohibition, the right to privacy against
unreasonable searches and seizures was of no practical value.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions acknowledged the
necessity of the exclusionary rule to a satisfactory implementation
of the fourth amendment by extending the Boyd-Weeks doctrine to
different factual situations.'8 None of the successive cases deviated
from the conjoined fourth-fifth amendment analysis formulated in
Boyd nor from a reliance on the judicial integrity justification for
the exclusion of relevant yet illegally obtained evidence. The deterrent aspect emphasized in Stone v. Powell was never considered in
these early formative opinions. This absence at least raises some
question as to the supposed predominance of the deterrent function
over the other purposes of the exclusionary rule."'
The progression of decisions relying upon the judicial integrity
purpose of the exclusionary rule culminated in the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Holmes in Olmstead v.
United States.' These often quoted dissents are the clearest and
most forceful expression of the imperative of judicial integrity. The
majority opinion had exempted police wire-tapping of the defendant's telephone from the prohibition of the fourth amendment by
adopting a restrictive interpretation of the amendment that
necessitated physical invasion of the individual's person or
premises. 1 The dissenting opinions however recognized a broader
scope of privacy guaranteed by the fourth amendment. Each concluded that this method of eavesdropping was an unreasonable
search within the meaning of the terms irrespective of any physical
trespass.
47.
48.

232 U.S. at 393-94.
See, e.g., Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); Byars v. United

States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Amos v. United

States, 225 U.S. 313 (1921); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Silverthrone
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
49.

See text at 111-118.

50. 277 U.S. 438, 469, 471 (1928). Mr. Justices Butler and Stone also dissented
to the majority opinion.
51. Id at 464-66
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The dissenters were especially interested in the preservation
of an ethical and fair-minded governing process. Wire-tapping was illegal within the state in which the federal law officials had collected
the incriminating evidence, so that each participant had already
committed a state crime. When the federal government then convicted the defendants on the basis of the information thus obtained,
Mr. Justice Brandeis regarded the admission of such evidence an
assumption of moral responsibility for the crimes committed. "[If
this court should permit the government ... to effect its purpose of
punishing the defendants, there would seem to be present all the
elements of a ratification. If so, the government itself would become
a lawbreaker. . .. 52
Mr. Justice Holmes expressed equal concern for the role that
government should play in obtaining incriminating evidence. In his
dissent, the problem was presented as a choice between two competing principles of policy.
It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to
that end that all available evidence should be used. It also
is desirable that the government should not itself foster
and pay for other crimes, when they are the means by
which the evidence is to be obtained. . . . We have to
choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some
criminals should escape than that the government should
play an ignoble part."
The principle that emerges from these early decisions and
forms the nucleus of the judicial integrity argument is that the
court as a part of the governing process should operate as a
restraint not only upon individuals but upon itself as well. In this
sense, giving effect to the exclusionary rule is no different than
when the court declares a statute or other legislation unconstitutional. In both instances, the court as a co-equal third of the government performs its constitutional mandate of checking the excesses
of the legislative and executive branches. By refusing to recognize
52. Id. at 483. Mr. Justice Brandeis continued,
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials
shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the
citizen. . . . To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the
end justifies the means-to declare that government may commit crimes
in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court should
resolutely set its face.
53. Id. at 470.
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illegally obtained evidence, courts exercise a minimal amount of
scrutiny and control over enforcement activities consistent within
our traditional system of checks and balances. Maintaining respect
and public confidence in the governing process as a whole is a byproduct of the judicial intergrity purpose of the exclusionary rule.
This is feasible only because the courts often occupy a buffer position between the individual citizen and a pervasive government. The
intermediate position of the courts stems from their functional roles
as interpretor of the constitution and guarantor of personal rights.
As Mr. Justice Brandeis warns in his dissent:
[I]t is .. . immaterial that the intrusion was in aid of law
enforcement. Experiences should teach us to be most on
our guard to protect liberty when the government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally
alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding."
Taken within this context, the exclusionary rule can be regarded as
merely another part of the institutional restraints inherent within
our constitutional form of government.
The same constraining principle applies with equal force when
the exclusionary rule is given effect on federal habeas review of
state convictions. The federal system of government as embodied in
the Constitution is a two-way concept. Not only must the central
government respect state sovereignty and powers, but the individual states must also yield to minimum facets of conformity
necessary for a workable federal system. 55 Such an arrangement is
implicit within the concept of federalism. Provincial interests and
prejudices are to a certain extent subordinated to the interest of
54.
55.

Id. at 479.

The conclusion that a federal court should, at some point,
have the power to decide the merits of all federal constitutional questions
arising in state criminal proceedings (with a habeas court doing so if the
Supreme Court has failed to review the issue) may be a sound one,
resting on the specific institutional and political premises of our constitutional federalism. . . . The creation of a remedial framework to ensure effective implementation of these commands is, therefore, one of the important tasks of our system.
Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,76
HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963).
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uniformity. As governments grow larger and more duplicative, there
is an accompanying necessity for consistency and simplicity in operation. The guideline for such uniformity is, of course, the federal Constitution, and the extent to which states' interests suffer depends
upon how it is interpreted and executed. One important means of
implementing the provisions of the federal Constitution is through
the traditional extraordinary writ of habeas corpus, which in later
decisions had been broadened to include any deprivation of a constitutional right." Although the scope of federal habeas corpus is
restricted to the constitutional issue presented, thereby distinguishing it from an appeal, the writ still provides a limited form of
review when alternative modes of reconsideration have been blocked or are unavailable. 7
By virtue of its restrictive scope, federal habeas corpus appears a reasonable means of both respecting state rights and yet
standardizing constitutional protection. The federal government
possesses no exclusive claim to oppressive police practices. State
law enforcement is subject to the same unconstitutional excesses
that abridge individual liberty and originally led to the formulation
of the exclusionary rule. The need for an effective means of enforcing the fourth amendment is therefore the same. Habeas corpus is
the medium through which the federal judiciary can inhibit unconstitutional activity in the states while still remaining within the
strictures of federalism. The unique dependence of the fourth
amendment upon the exclusionary rule renders its application in
federal habeas review of state convictions as indispensable to the
protection of privacy as if the case had originated in the federal
system of courts. Giving effect to the exclusionary rule therefore
tends to promote a healthy modicum of uniformity within the states.
Uniformity in this context should not be regarded as stifling
56. See Mr. Justice Brennan's account of the historical development of habeas
corpus in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 399-426. Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
250 (Powell, J., concurring). Compare Bator, supra note 55, at 463-507, with Reitz,
Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARV. L. REV.
1315 (1961). For a list of other authorities on the history of federal habeas corpus, see
, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2501 n.6 (1977).
U.S. Wainwright v. Sykes, __
57. As Mr. Justice Brennan noted,
A defendant by commiting a procedural default may be barred from
challenging his conviction in the state courts even on federal constitutional grounds ....
It is a familiar principle that the Supreme Court will also decline to
review state court judgments which rest on independent and adequate
state grounds, notwithstanding the co-presence of federal grounds.
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 428 (1963).
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adherence to a static rule but rather as the relatively fundamental
right to privacy which citizens should reasonably be able to expect
from their coexistent federal and state governments. Federal habeas
corpus for state prisoners then helps to maintain the integrity of
state governments by ensuring that constitutional standards have
been fairly and uniformly met. Interference with state affairs is held
to a tolerable level because of the limited scope of review described
above. Hence, state governments share in the aura of public confidence and respect engendered by the judicial insistence upon principles of law.
Despite contrary statements in Stone, the exclusionary rule
does effectuate the objectives of the fourth amendment by means
other than deterrence. The injury to a victim of an unreasonable
search is also redressed as much as possible by excluding from the
trial evidence or other information" thereby obtained. The Stone
argument presupposes that the only valid means of effectuating the
fourth amendment through the exclusionary rule is the future
prevention of physical intrusions upon privacy by deterring unconstitutional police conduct. This approach is too restrictive and
shortsighted. The court can obviously do nothing to alter the past
physical fact of an unreasonable search or seizure. Yet, the objective
of the fourth amendment can still be effectuated by rectifying the
legal consequences which normally follow the violative conduct.
The PersonalAspect Of The Exclusionary Rule
The ultimate objective of the fourth amendment is to protect
the privacy of the individual's home and effects through the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. 9 In giving full effect to
the exclusionary rule on federal habeas corpus as well as on direct
review, the court seeks to approximate the state of affairs that existed before invasion of the citizen's privacy. Indeed, as Mr. Justice
'
Powell points out, this "reparation comes too late"6
to vindicate the
individual's right to privacy entirely in the sense of completely eras58. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (fruits of illegally seized evidence).
59.
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete
form of the case then before the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the government and
its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
60. 428 U.S. at 486 (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965)).
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ing the past physical intrusion. But this states a truism
characteristic of most judicial remedies.' Nevertheless, the rule can
still prevent an even greater and potentially more serious invasion
of privacy by proscribing the use of unconstitutionally obtained
evidence in a criminal trial" that is at least partially dependent
upon the implications of such evidence." An invasion of privacy does
not end simply with cessation of the physical act of intrusion, but
continues as long as the consequences of such derived evidence remain in effect." Regardless of whether the introduction of evidence
61. For example, damages cannot truly compensate the tort victim for pain
and suffering or defamation, the landowner for waste, simple trespass, or encroachments, the surviving family for wrongful death, and so on, because the "reparation comes too late." Nor does restitutionary relief always vindicate the plaintiffs
rights since it often forfeits the benefit of the bargain. The equitable remedy of
specific performance, although limited in application to only certain strictly defined
situtations, seems the closest equivalent to the exact reparation that Mr. Justice
Powell wants to impose upon the operation of the exclusionary rule. The impossibility
of fully restoring one's rights is shared by most other remedies and is the rule rather
than the exception. This is particularly true of tortious wrongs which are, most closely
related to criminal conduct, especially in the area of privacy rights.
62. Compare United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), which held that the
"exclusionary rule should not be extended to forbid the use in the civil proceeding of
one sovereign of evidence seized by a criminal law enforcement agent of another
sovereign." Id at 460.
63. Such implications are subject to the "harmless constitutional error" doctrine enunciated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The doctrine supports
the Stone argument that even constitutionl rights may be limited in particular situations where the benefits of adhering to the right are offset by the social costs of its application. However, it seems unusual that a fourth amendment claim based on the admission of unlawfully obtained evidence should ever be categorized as harmless error.
The Chapman Court characterized the test as "whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction." Id. at 23
(quoting from Fay v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)). The mere introduction of
evidence, especially if over the objection of defendant, attests to its contribution to the
conviction. Otherwise, the evidence would never have been offered. Here, the guilt
reliability of such evidence, cited in Stone as a reason for denying the fourth amendment claim on federal habeas corpus, militates against any finding of "harmless constitutional error." One can perhaps conceive of situations where the contribution of an
item of evidence might be minimal. Yet by the same token, it is unlikely that a prosecutor would be willing to risk the possible reversal of a conviction on appeal for only
an incremental indicia of guilt. More than likely, such illegally obtained evidence would
not be introduced unless actually needed for a conviction.
64. The consequences furthered by the judicial admission of evidence that was
acquired in violation of the fourth amendment lie in the broadened scope of public
scrutiny then available and the possible deprivation of freedom and/or property due to
the effect of prejudicial evidence. Surely these additional personal interests are entitled to as much constitutional protection as the virtually remediless physical invasion of
privacy.
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obtained through an unreasonable search and seizure is characterized as part of the original invasion of privacy or a separate violation
of the fourth amendment, the exclusionary rule prohibits any
judicial recognition that subjects the individual already victimized to
the further disadvantage of defending against the prejudicial influence of such evidence. Thus, the constitutional objective of the
fourth amendment is not furthered by anything less than the full application of the exclusionary rule on trial, appellate review, and
federal habeas corpus. At each level the effects of the initial invasion of privacy are still operative to threaten the liberty and security of the individual prosecuted.
The same early decisions that fashioned the "imperative of
judicial integrity" also relied upon the protection of personal constitutional rights as a legitimate function of the exclusionary rule.
The viablility of the judicial integrity argument itself depends upon
the willingness of the judicial system to safeguard the interests of
the defendant under the fourth amendment by disregarding relevant
yet illegally obtained evidence. The guarantees secured by the
fourth amendment are worth little if its protection is denied to the
very individuals who are most in need of it because of the serious
consequences at stake. The Boyd opinion recognized the personal
aspect of the fourth amendment and by implication the exclusionary
rule when Mr. Justice Bradley stated:
It is not the breaking of his doors and the rummaging of
his drawers that constitutes the essence of the offense;
but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal
security, personal liberty, and private property, where
that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of
some public offense-it is the invasion of this sacred right
which underlies and constitutes the essence of the [fourth
amendment prohibition against searches and seizures]."
After reference to the above remarks of Boyd, the Weeks decision
acknowledged the implication that the exclusionary rule is an indispensable means of vindicating the privacy interest of the defendant and not just of society in general.
If [personal effects] can thus be seized and held and used
in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the
protection of the Fourth Amendment, declaring his right
to be secure against such seizures, is of no value, and, so
65.

116 U.S. at 630.
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far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be
stricken from the Constitution."
The Boyd and Weeks decisions illustrate the interdependence
of government integrity and the protection of personal privacy interests. Although intimately related, each justifies application of the
exclusionary rule in a separate manner. As already noted, the
judicial integrity aspect of the rule operates as a self-regulating
check upon the government itself. The protection of individual
privacy, on the other hand, seeks to redress unwarranted intrusions
by negating consequent encroachments into the defendant's privacy.
This latter function of the rule focuses solely on the accused rather
than intra-governmental relationships or the interests of society as a
whole.
Even Wolf v. Colorado,67 a subsequent decision which denied
the imposition of the exclusionary rule on states, recognized the personal aspect of the rule when it depicted, "the exclusion of evidence
[as] a remedy which directly serves only to protect those upon
whose person or premises something incriminating has been
found."" Although Wolf was eventually overruled by Mapp v. Ohio,
the latter opinion also relied upon the "integrity of individual
70
rights"" as well in expanding application to the states.
An individual has a personal right of constitutional dimensions
to the unabridged effectuation of the exclusionary rule, and this
right provides the basis from which the very meaning of the fourth
amendment is derived. Certainly, the exclusionary rule "is not a personal constitutional right 71 in itself, since nowhere in the Constitution is it expressly mentioned. Nevertheless, the fourth amendment
absent the effect of the exclusionary rule is reduced to a mere "form
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

232 U.S. at 393.
338 U.S, 25 (1949).
Id. at 30-31.
367 U.S. 643, 647 (1961).

In short, the admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf could
not consistently tolerate denial of its most important constitutional
privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had
been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise
is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. ... The philosophy of each Amendment and of each freedom is complementary to, although not dependent upon, that of the other in its
sphere of influence-the very least that together they assume in either
sphere is that no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional evidence.
Id. at 656-57.
71. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465. 486 (1976).
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of words"'" representing a constitutional right which has little, if
any, meaningful substance. In effect, the rule gives content to the
prohibitions of the fourth amendment by providing the only viable
means presently available to remedy violations of an individual's
right to privacy.7 s The exclusionary rule is thus an indispensable
condition to the actualization of privacy interests comprising the
fourth amendment.
When Stone v. Powell denied the personal aspect of the exclusionary rule, the generalized effect of the rule upon society as a
whole was confused with its actual limited purpose in trial. Strictly
construed, the exclusionary rule has no function outside the confines
of a trial. The defendant is provided an opportunity through application of the rule to object to the admission and use of evidence obtained and offered in violation of his fourth amendment right of
privacy. In deliberating upon defendant's motion to suppress, the
trial judge is not concerned with the generalized effect of his ruling
on society. His focus should concentrate instead on whether the
defendant's privacy interest in home and personal effects has been
violated by an "unreasonable search and seizure." The generalized
effect of the exclusionary rule outside the trial context is of secondary concern. It is an important concern, but not the prime nor
original reason for which the exclusionary rule was formulated.'
Moreover, the deterrent effect on unlawful police conduct, which
Stone v. Powell emphasizes, ultimately depends on the personal application of the exclusionary rule to individual defendants on trial.
Fourth amendment rights cannot be generally safeguarded in society absent the protection of the individual constitutional rights of
privacy, for society is not something other than the individuals
which comprise it. The general deterrence doctrine derives
whatever effectiveness it has from the personal use of the exclusionary rule by defendants, not from the rule itself in isolation.
The Deterrent Function And Its Role In Stone v. Powell
The deterrent function of the exclusionary rule first surfaced in
Wolf v. Colorado, which was decided more than thirty-five years
after the first expression of the principle. Prior to Wolf, deterrence
72. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. at 392.
73. See note 108 infra.
74. There is no evidence suggesting that the framers of the exclusionary rule
concerned themselves or even considered what deterrent effect the operation of the
rule would have upon the police or society in general. See generally Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) and pp. 100-07.
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of unconstitutional conduct was never forwarded as a reason for the
exclusion of evidence. This conspicuous absence from the formative
period of the exclusionary rule tends to depreciate deterrence as the
prime justification for the judicial remedy. The reversal of Wolf and
subsequent application of the exclusionary rule to the states by
Mapp v. Ohio was not principally based "upon the belief that exclusion would deter future unlawful police conduct,"7 as claimed in
Stone. Rather, the Mapp opinion was predicated almost entirely
upon the judicial integrity and personal aspect justifications for the
rule." The deterrent purpose was advanced primarily in reference to
an earlier case, 7 and exercised only minimal influence on the opinion. Although the deterrence objective of the exclusionary rule can
hardly be ignored, reliance upon the Mapp decision to support its
pre-eminent status among the multiple purposes of the rule is
misplaced.
The restrictive effect of post-Mapp decisions upon the scope of
the exclusionary rule stems from reliance upon the deterrent function. It is no coincidence that three of the four cases cited in support
of the deterrent emphasis of Stone v. Powell were decisions which
denied retroactivity of the rule. 8 The first and most significant decision, Linkletter v. Walker," rejected extension of Mapp to state convictions which had become final prior to the reversal of Wolf. This
denial of retroactivity was primarily predicated on the unlikelihood
that deterrence of police misconduct would be advanced by making
the rule retrospective." Although reluctance to expand Mapp
beyond prospective application was understandable due to the anticipated volume of appeals, the narrowness of the Linkletter rationale is still difficult to justify. As Mr. Justice Black pointed out in
his dissent:
I have read and reread the Mapp opinion but have been
unable find one word in it to indicate that the exclusionary search and seizure rule should be limited on the

75. 428 U.S. at 484.
76. See 367 U.S. at 646-48, 656, 657, 659-60.
77. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
78. 428 U.S. at 486.
79. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
80. Id at 636-37. Other reasons mentioned for the denial of retroactivity were
state-federal relationships (federalism), the orderly administration of justice (the
unavailability of evidence or witnesses years after the convictions) finality of judgment, and the integrity of the judicial process. See pp. 100-07 for a discussion of the
later notion.
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basis that it was intended to do nothing in the world except to deter officers of the law."'
Nevertheless, despite this lack of support in Mapp, subsequent decisions such as Tehan v. Shott" and United States v. Peltier," which
were also cited by Stone and dealt with the same issue of retroactivity, continued to emulate the deterrent analysis of Linkletter
with only minor variations. None of these decisions concerning
retroactivity expressly renounced the additional justifications that
had been traditionally recognized for application of the rule."
Although seldom mentioned, the other purposes underlying the exclusionary rule were certainly as relevant to the outcome of these
later decisions as the deterrent function, inasmuch as the sole issue
was the retroactivity of a previous interpretation of the fourth
amendment.
What emerges then from this cursory review of post-Mapp
decisions is a principle of selective treatment applicable whenever
the scope of the exclusionary rule is to be restricted. If the
availability of the exclusion remedy is limited, then only the deterrent purpose of the rule is acknowledged by the Court since its ineffectiveness can most plausibly be argued in a variety of factual contexts." The additional functions of the exclusionary rule are largely
81. Id. at 649 (Black, J., dissenting).
82. 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
83. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
84. The Peltier decision explicitly recognized the "imperative of judicial integrity" purpose of the exclusionary rule. Id. at 536-39. The Court reconciled its denial
of retroactivity by holding that
the "imperative judicial integrity" is also not offended if law enforcement
officials reasonably believed in good faith that their conduct was in accordance with the law even if decisions subsequent to the search or seizure
have held that conduct of the type engaged in by the law enforcement officials is not permitted by the Constitution.
Id. at 538. This rationalization ignores that the imperative also applies to courts, which
have an even greater duty to disaffirm unreasonable searches and seizures. Morever,
the judiciary cannot hide behind a good faith standard of decision-making.
85. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (a grand jury
witness may not refuse to answer questions on the ground of a fourth amendment
claim); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) (only those individuals
whose privacy rights have been actually infringed have standing to object to the introduction of unconstitutionally seized evidence); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S.
543, 560-61 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting) (that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary
rule on police is not lessened by application of the harmless error doctrine to an illegal
search); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (denial of the "silver platter"
doctrine whereby evidence illegally obtained by state officials could be used in a
federal criminal trial); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (the fourth
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ignored unless the operation of the rule is reaffirmed, because their
relevance and effect are less subject to qualification and therefore
more difficult to reconcile with restrictions on the application of the
rule. Stone is simply the latest case following the lead established
by Linkletter.
The success of the deterrence theory of the exclusionary rule is
also questioned by Mr. Justice Powell in Stone. He is not the first
critic of the rule to doubt its presumed effect upon police conduct in
violation of the fourth amendment. Empirical studies, referred to in
Stone, indicate that the proscription of evidence obtained in derogation of the fourth amendment at whatever judicial level has not proven to be the anticipated panacea of individual privacy." Some investigations suggest that unreasonable searches and seizures by the
police have continued virtually unabated since Mapp was decided in
1961," thereby calling into question the effectiveness of the deterrent function. Measurements on a variety of indices" have convinced
many researchers of the general impotency of the rule's deterrent
effect on the acquisition of illegal evidence. Yet these same researchamendment exclusionary rule does not prohibit the impeachment of a defendant who
testifies in his own behalf). Cf. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (An inadmissible statement under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) may still be used by
the state to impeach the credibilitk of the defendant.).
The Calandra decision is particularly relevant in that Mr. Justice Powell
wrote the majority opinion and employed the same social cost-benefit analysis that he
later used in the Stone case.
86. 428 U.S. at 492 n.32.
87. See generally Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Oaks], Spiotto, Search and
Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J.
LEGAL STUDIES 243 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Spiotto]. Contra, Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous
Conclusion, 62 KY. L.J. 681, 684 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Canon]. Critique, On the
Limitations of Empirical Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the
Spiotto Research and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 740 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Critique].
88. The Oaks study, for example, attempted to measure the presumed detterent effect according to the results of questionnaires, the exclusionary rule's effect
upon motions to suppress evidence, its effect upon arrests and convictions, the change
in the amount of property seized by police, reported reasons by police for arrests,
observations of police behavior, and a comparison with the Canadian experience
without the rule. Oaks, supra note 87, at 678-709.
The Spiotto research, supra note 87, at 254-69, concentrated on the incidence and frequency of motions to suppress at different stages of proceeding and
evaluated such according to the effect that a variety of factors had upon the ultimate
disposition of the motion.
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ers and the author of Stone itself admit that the evidence is inconclusive."
Moreover, the empirical evidence advanced in these earlier
surveys has been qualified by subsequent research. Whereas some
of the indices suggest that the deterrent aspect of the exclusionary
rule is weak or nonexistent, other indicators show a positive relationship between the imposition of the rule and a reduction in the
amount of unconstitutional police activity." The commentators in
these later studies have depreciated previous findings critical of the
deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule on the bases of sample,
design, and interpretation. 1 At the very least, the more recent
studies reinforce the inconclusiveness of prior statistical examinations." Even if the indecisiveness of this new data is also conceded,
89. Oaks, supra note 87, at 709. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 n. 32. See
note 92 infra.
90. See Canon, supra note 87, at 702-725. Canon concludes:
Different measures point in varied and sometimes slightly contradictory
directions and some of the results are subject to ambigous interpretation.
Taken as a whole, the main emphasis to be put on the findings is a
negative one; they cast considerable doubt on earlier conclusions that the
rule is ineffective in deterring illegal police searches. To be sure, such an
assertion may have been appropriate at one time, and as some of our
evidence suggests, there are still circumstances in which the rule has a
minimal impact on police behavior. But these circumstances are comparatively few. Most of our data do not permit such an inference. Indeed,
a good many of the findings support a positive inference-that the rule
goes far toward fulfilling its purpose. Beyond this, the incomplete nature
of the data and ambiguity of its interpretation serve to aid arguments on
behalf of the rule's effectiveness because in this situation at least it is
easier to demonstrate the existence of widespread non-compliance with
the fourth amendment than it is to demonstrate compliance.
Id. at 725-26.
91. Critique, supra note 87, at 744-56. The author summarizes his disagreement with a prior research effort with the following reasons:
First, it rests on a highly selective interpretation of data which was collated in a somewhat haphazard fashion. Second, the inference upon which
the conclusion of the rule's deterrent inefficacy rests is based on a
research design which contains a critical mistake regarding the date of
the rule's introduction in Illinois. Third, motions to suppress cannot be used as indicators of illegal searches for the type of research question posed
by Spiotto.
See also Canon, supra note 87, at 697-702.
92.
Nonetheless, the inconclusiveness of our findings is real enough; they
do not nail down an argument that the exclusionary rule has accomplished
its task.
Id at 726.
A review of Spiotto's research and that conducted by others does not
demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the exclusionary rule. Rather it tends
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such evidence reestablishes in at least some contexts the possiblity
of the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule.
The principal reason underlying the reluctance of the Stone
majority to accept the unqualified extension of the deterrence argument to federal habeas corpus was an adherence
to the view that these considerations support the implementation of the exclusionary rule at trial and its enforcement on direct appeal of state court convictions. But
. . there [is no] reason to assume that any specific
disincentive already created by the risk of exclusion of
evidence at the trial or the reversal of convictions on
direct review would be enhanced if there were the further
risk that a conviction obtained in state court and affirmed
on direct review might be overturned in collateral proceedings often occurring years after the incarceration of
the defendant."
These remarks imply that the Stone concept of the efficacy of deterrence depends upon the proximity of review to the unlawful police
activity. Thus, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule would be
lessened as judicial review of the police conduct in question became
more remote in time and stage of proceeding. Deterrence, according
to the Stone analysis, would be strongest when the exclusionary
rule is immediately effected by the trial court, weaker when
resulting in reversal on direct review, and minimal or non-existent
when the protection of the rule is given effect on collateral attack.
Stone v. Powel's deterrence theory of "diminishing returns""u
is plausible, but the explanation is subject to the same limitations of
research previously noted making empirical verification difficult. An
equally plausible theory of deterrence rests on a different premise
concerning police perception of the exclusionary rule. This alternative theory suggests that deterrence is not a function of proximito illustrate the obstacles that stand in the way of any sound, empirical
evaluation of the rule. When all factors are considered, there is virtually
no likelihood that the Court is going to receive any "relevant statistics"
which objectively measure the "practical efficacy" of the exclusionary
rule.
Critique, supra note 87, at 763-64.
93. 428 U.S. at 493.
94. Id at 493 n.34. This reference to "diminishing returns" may not have the
same meaning as it is used by Amsterdam, since he emphasizes repetitive rather than
temporal measurement. Nevertheless, the term will be employed in the latter sense as
defined in the text.
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ty, but rather a function of police dissatisfaction and frustration
with the overall practical effect of the exclusionary rule.
This theory proceeds upon the basis that law enforcement officials are discouraged from violating fourth amendment rights if
ever because effectuation of the exclusionary rule at any stage of
judicial proceedings makes their work more difficult and ineffective.
Personal perceptions of efficacy, equity, and professionalism are impugned by judicial application of the exclusionary rule to evidence
conscientiously compiled by police investigation. If accurate, the effectuation of the exclusionary rule on federal habeas review would
engender just as much police discontent with the operation of the
rule as on trial and appellate levels. At this stage, not only have law
enforcement resources been fruitlessly squandered, but a potentially
dangerous individual may be released to threaten society once
again. This increases police work loads and exposes the organization
to allegations of inefficiency. Such broad policy concerns are
operative regardless of how remote the judicial application of the
rule is from police conduct. In short, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule does not vary throughout prolonged judicial proceedings because the practical impact of the rule upon law enforcement remains the same."
It is this general recognition of the rule's inhibitory influence
on law enforcement practices and efficiency that forms the basis of
the deterrence theory of the exclusionary rule since personal sanctions are rarely involved. One must otherwise presume that police
officers who have not directly encountered the operation of the rule
themselves are not deterred from unreasonable searches and
seizures. This approach to the deterrent function presents a rather
unflattering picture of police enforcement inasmuch as it
characterizes the attitude toward the exclusionary rule in terms of
"out of sight, then out of mind." The Stone interpretation of the
95. But see Oaks, supra note 87, at 720-24, in which the author notes that the
variable effect of deterrence upon police depends on the character of the illegal activity being investigated. Even if the variable effect of deterrence is conceded, the exclusionary rule may at least have some effect on police behavior in the investigation of
more "serious" crimes that will more than likely go to trial. This fact alone may be sufficient to justify its retention.
It should also be noted that the publicity attendant "serious" crimes may
draw public and police attention to the exclusion of evidence at even later stages of
judicial review. The public outrage accompanying the retrial or release of a successful,
yet obviously guilty, federal habeas applicant cannot escape police attention. This may
provide even greater disincentives for ignoring the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
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deterrent effect errs when it purports to quantify police reaction to
the exclusion of evidence according to the judicial stage at which it
is effectuated. Certainly, most law enforcement officials are unaware
of and disinterested in what transpires in a case beyond the trial
level in which they participate, but that does not mean they are ignorant of the operation of the exclusionary rule in subsequent
judicial proceedings. More likely, police officers perceive and understand the practical effect of the rule's utilization regardless of its
immediacy.
Stone's adherence to enforcement of the exclusionary rule on
direct review of state convictions" also undermines its argument,
because the appeal process may also last "years after the incarceration of the defendant"" as with federal habeas corpus. Moreover,
once presently available state remedies have been exhausted, the
defendant can obtain federal habeas review even before certiorari is
attempted demonstrating that the collateral remedy may be more
proximate to police perception than direct review." This inconsistency in the reasoning of Stone may presage further restrictions on the
application of the exclusionary rule in contexts other than the trial
level.
Effecting the exclusionary rule on federal habeas review contributes as much to the overall deterrent effect as any other application of the rule, insofar as it is the "practical" influence of the rule
upon law enforcement that constitutes the disincentive necessary
for any discouragement of future police misconduct. Consequently,
restrictions on the application of the rule on federal habeas review
detract from the total deterrent effect as much as any restraint on
its trial use. Deterrence, therefore, depends upon the reconsideration of fourth amendment claims on federal habeas review as well as
at the trial and appellate court levels. No rational basis exists for
differentiating degrees of deterrence predicted upon the proximity
of judicial examination to unconstitutional police behavior.
The Educative Effect Of The Exclusionary Rule
Although the immediacy of the exclusionary rule to law endorcement authorities serves a vital social function, this role more
appropriately relates to what Mr. Justice Powell terms the
"educative effect of the exclusionary rule":"
96. 428
97. Id.
98. See
U.S. 391, 435-38
99. 428

U.S. at 493.
also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 509 n.8 (1976); Fay v. Noia, 372
(1963).
U.S. at 493.
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[Olur society attaches serious consequences to violation of
constitutional rights and is thought to encourage those
who formulate law enforcement policies, and the officers
who implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment
ideals into their value system....
[E]ach case in which such claim is considered may
add marginally to an awareness of the values protected by
the Fourth Amendment. 100

The exclusionary rule thus may contribute to the implementation of
fourth amendment rights not only by discouraging "unreasonable
searches and seizures" by the police, but also by conveying relevant
constitutional guidelines to the same officials. Here the educative effect of the exclusionary rule, unlike the deterrent function, is
somewhat dependent upon proximity to law enforcement, since
awareness of the rule and the reasons for its operation are more
likely to be learned and retained if encountered on a first-hand basis
rather than indirectly through the deterrent effect of the rule. This
reliance upon proximity does not necessarily depreciate the importance of the educative purpose of the rule on collateral review, since
federal habeas corpus is sometimes the only avenue available to air
a state prisoner's constitutional claim.' Application of the exclusionary rule on federal habeas review serves as an alternate route
through which fourth amendment information may still be communicated to the enforcement branch of government. Although
there are problems in substantiating the deterrent effect of the rule
empirically, its continued effectuation on federal habeas corpus may
still be justifiable solely on the basis of this educative function
which provides another means of introducing and instilling appropriate constitutional precepts."' The positive nature of the
100. Id at 492-93.
101. See note 57 supra.
102.
By demonstrating that society will attach serious consequences to the
violation of constitutional rights, the exclusionary rule invokes and
magnifies the moral and educative force of the law. Over the long term
this may integrate some fourth amendment ideals into the value system
or norms of behavior of law enforcement agencies.
Oaks, supra note 87, at 756. See also id. at 711-12, 729.
As has always been the case, the educative effect of the exclusionary rule
ultimately depends upon the clarity of the analysis associated with its application. Only
if readily understandable principles are offered in explanation of the rule's operation
can law enforcement authorities be expected to make appropriate constitutional decisions in regard to fourth amendment rights. Id at 731. The Supreme Court has
perhaps been validly criticized in the past for not rendering discernible guidelines for
police conduct. Stone offers no such guidance since it avoided the fourth amendment
claim completely.
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educative effect, as contrasted to the negative character of the
deterrent function, would be further enhanced if something other
than disincentives were available to encourage police compliance
with the demands of the fourth amendment. If positive incentives
were also provided,' the educative effect of the exclusionary rule
might emerge from behind the shadow of the deterrent function as
the predominant justification for the rule. In this manner, the carrot
and stick approach of the educative and deterrent purposes of the
exclusionary rule might be more effective in realizing the objectives
of the fourth amendment.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS

OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND

FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS

Nowhere does the Constitution expressly require that illegally
obtained evidence be excluded form judicial proceedings. Yet it is
also clear from the language in numerous decisions'" "that the [exclusionary] rule is of constitutional origin ....
'
The appropriate
characterization of the exclusionary rule remains then a central
question in the evaluation of the Stone v. Powell argument. Is it
merely, as Mr. Justice Powell asserts in Stone, a judicial implement
designed to effectuate the rights secured by the fourth amendment?
If so, the rule would justifiably be subject to virtually any limitation
predicated on persuasive policy considerations. Or is the rule, as Mr.
Justice Brennan maintains in his dissent to Stone, "a constitutional
ingredient of the fourth amendment, any modification of [which]
should at least be accomplished with some modicum of logic and
justification . .. T106
103. One positive incentive might include increased salary and/or rank for participation in ongoing legal education clinics. Such programs do not ensure actual observance of fourth amendment rights but at least provides continuous exposure to relevant principles and guidelines. See Spiotto, supra note 87, at 274-75. Another possible
incentive might be greater judicial or civic encouragement and recognition of police
adherence to constitutional standards. An often overlooked yet invaluable source of
positive encouragement for police is the local prosecutor, who is in an unparalleled
position to impart information and guidance. Whether such contact is informal or takes
place in a trial setting the prosecutor has a prime opportunity to explain the permissible limits of the fourth amendment prohibition to officers. Id at 276. See also Oaks,
supra note 87, at 730-31.
104. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 47 (1949) (Rutledge, J., dissenting);
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462 (1928); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S.
28, 29-30 (1927); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, (1914).
105. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 649.
106. 428 U.S. at 534 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Although the opinions in Stone v. Powell appear to leave no
middle ground, the answer may lie somewhere between the two
alternatives suggested above. The exclusionary rule is only one of a
variety of possible judicial and administrative methods that could be
employed to enforce compliance with the prescription of the fourth
amendment. Possible variations include civil tort remedies against
or criminal prosecution of law enforcement officials, administrative
disciplinary proceedings, and even reasonable citizen resistance to
unconstitutional searches and seizures. However, prior experience
with other means of securing compliance with the fourth amendment have not proven entirely satisfactory as borne out by the majority opinion in Mapp, which stated, "the [impression] ... that such
other remedies have been worthless and futile is buttressed by the
experience of other states." ' 7 The comparative inadequacy of other
"remedies" when coupled with the fact that the exclusionary rule is
the only viable means presently available to effectuate the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures ' 8 integrates
the rule into the Constitution more intimately than the position normally occupied by a judicial rule of law. Within this context, imposing limitations on even a judicially created rule necessarily hinders
full effectuation of the desired objective: in this instance, the rights
guaranteed by the fourth amendment. Thus, although the exclusionary rule may only express malleable judicial policy as Mr.
Justice Powell points out, past experience and exclusive reliance on
the exclusionary rule still make it indispensable to the continued
vitality and effectiveness of the fourth amendment.
If the foregoing is accurate, then the Stone cost-benefit
analysis of the exclusionary rule is inappropriate and should not be
followed, inasmuch as social costs or benefits are irrelevant to the
enforcement of constitutional guarantees." While social considera107. 367 U.S. at 652. See also Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 137 (1954); Wolf
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41-6 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d
434, 445, 282 P.2d 905, 911 (1955).
108. See Spiotto, supra note 87, at 269-72; Critique, supra note 87, at 792-93;
Oaks, supra note 87, at 673-74.
109.
As was noted at the beginning of the article, the exclusionary rule is
undergoing a crisis. On the basis of some cursory and perhaps symptomatice diagnosis, it has nearly been pronounced dead. In the not too distant future our courts and legislative bodies will have to decide whether
they want to accept this diagnosis and issue the death certificate.
Hopefully in this situation, as should be the case in all important questions of public policy, such a decision will be based on as large a quantity
of reliable and valid information as can reasonably be obtained. This is
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tions may be relevant to the interpretaton of "unreasonable" in the
language of the fourth amendment, such conventional notions cannot
affect its enforcement. That determination was made and taken out
of the hands of the judiciary when the constitution was initially formulated. Courts must enforce the prohibitions of the fourth amendment to the fullest extent, and the exclusionary rule is a tool of enforcement, not interpretation. Restrictions upon the application of
the exclusionary rule are, therefore, by inference impermissible
limitations upon the scope of the fourth amendment itself due to
their interrelationship.
One cannot reasonably presume that the framers of the constitution were naive enough to believe that mere statement of the
fourth amendment was sufficient to secure the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. They undoubtedly realized and
anticipated that additional implements would be necessary to fully
protect the interests of personal privacy against unwarranted invasions by government officials. In the absence of viable alternatives,
the exclusionary rule alone preserves the integrity of the fourth
amendment. This intimate relationship with the fourth amendment
should accord the exclusionary rule the respect usually accruing to a
provision of constitutional status even if such deference is
derivatively acquired. Any single rule of law which not only
facilitates but actually enables the operation of a constitutional provision deserves the same judicial recognition and protection as the
right itself.
Because the relationship between the exclusionary rule and the
fourth amendment is so intimate, it is somewhat ironic that Stone
denies reconsideration of allegedly inadmissable evidence on federal
habeas corpus but not other levels of proceeding. Absent a showing
of "inadequate" state treatment, federal habeas corpus relief for
state prisoners asserting fourth amendment claims will now be prohibited. The interests protected by the fourth amendment through
the exclusionary rule would seemingly be more pronounced rather
than rstricted due to the exclusive attention devoted to the infringements of constitutional guarantees on federal habeas corpus.
particularly the case where constitutional policies are involved. By definition as well as by tradition, such policies should be stable. Stability should
not be equated with inflexibility. But stability does mean that constitutional policies should be more than mere reflections of prevailing
ideological winds, and it suggests that the consideration which goes into
the promulgation of these policies extends beyond casual or emotional
reaction to particular events or short-term political pressures.
Canon, supra note 87, at 726.
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. Yet the question still remains: why provide a special remedy
for constitutional claims when state trial and appellate courts have
the explicit duty to recognize and protect constitutional rights? A
variety of answers have been offered to explain this seeming
duplication of effort. Some writers have commented on the relative
1
inadequacy of state post-conviction procedures and record-keeping." '
Although most states are adopting improved post-conviction techniques, there may be merit to the suggestion that federal habeas corpus continues to act as an incentive for states to improve methods
of ensuring constitutional rights by providing an ongoing and independent check upon convictions."' The Court in Kaufman v.
United States recognized this aspect of federal habeas review when
it held that, "the availability of collateral remedies is necessary to
insure the integrity of proceedings at and before trial where constitutional rights are at stake."'1 2 A byproduct of this federal
stimulus, as with the judicial integrity purpose of the exclusionary
rule, is a healthy consistency of minumum standards of constitutional protection throughout the states."' Another commentator has5
remarked on the greater likelihood of impartiality"' and expertise"
in the federal system as contrasted to local state courts. This
perspective is subject to serious dispute and has been criticized as
an unwarranted aspersion upon the quality and integrity of state
judicial systems."' Nevertheless, defenders of state sovereignty cannot realistically deny past unconstitutional deprivations on the part
of state courts. Such abridgements of constitutional guarantees laid
110. Bator, supra note 55, at 519-23; Wright and Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Allocation of Fact-FindingResponsibility, 75 YALE L.J.
895, 898-902, 984 (1966); Freund, Remarks, in Symposium: Habeas Corpus-Proposals
for Reform, 9 UTAH L. REV. 18, 28-29 (1964). See generally Reitz, FederalHabeas Corpus: Post Conviction Remedy for State Prisoners,108 PAC. L. REV. 461, 487-97 (1960).
111. See Schaefer, Federalism and State CriminalProcedure, 70 HARV. L. REV.
1, 24 (1956); Reitz, supra note 4, at 1352-54.
112. 394 U.S. at 225. Inasmuch as Kaufman concerned the availability of federal
habeas review for federal prisoners, this statement applies with even greater force to
state prisoners, who have not already had the opportunity to be heard in a federal
forum. But see 428 U.S. at 481 n.16, where Mr. Justice Powell rejects the Kaufman extension of the exclusionary rule to federal habeas reveiw of state convictions as mere
dicta. He also characterizes the Kaufman decision as an illustration of the Supreme
Court's supervisory role over lower federal courts. Certainly, this was not the meaning
of Mr. Justice Brennan, the author of Kaufman, as evidenced by his dissenting
remarks in Stone, 428 U.S. at 519-23.
113. See note 55 supra. Wright and Sofaer, supra note 110, at 897-99.
114. Bator, supra note 55, at 510.
115. Id.
116. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
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the foundation for expansion of federal habeas corpus to those in
state custody.'17 State prisoners asserting fourth amendment claims
should have a right to press such claims in the judicial system which
has the ultimate responsibility and explicit authority to adjudicate
constitutional issues: the federal court system. Mr. Justice Brennan
in Kaufman unmistakably expressed this right:
Our decisions leave no doubt that the federal habeas
remedy extends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally obtained evidence was admitted against
them at trial.

The provision of federal collateral remedies rests
...
• . . fundamentally upon a recognition that adequate protection of constitutional rights relating to the criminal
trial process requires the continuing availability of a
mechanism for relief.

...
With regard to both federal and state prisoners,
Congress has determined that the full protection of their
constitutional rights requires the availability of a
mechanism for collateral attack. The right then is not
merely to a federal forum but to full and fair consideration of constitutional claims."'

Virtually all of the above reasons for providing federal habeas
corpus to state prisoners can be capsulized into the different emphases of the state trial-appellate review versus federal habeas
review. On the state trial and appeal levels of primary concern is
the determination of legal guilt or innocence. Review on federal
habeas corpus, on the other hand, depends jurisdictionally on a
federal constitutional question being presented by the applicant in
custody."' Constitutional issues may too easily become obscured by
117. Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisioners:The Isolation Principle, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 78, (1964).
118. 394 U.S. at 225, 226, 228.
119.
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district
court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of
a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the
ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. §2254 (a) (1977) (emphasis added).
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the emphasis on the determination of guilt at the trial and appellate
levels. Recognition of this possibility and the inherent fallibility'2 of
men led to the formulation of habeas review of constitutional claims
in order to protect more fully these basic tenets upon which our
society is grounded. The limited focus of federal habeas corpus,
divorced from considerations of guilt, provides a greater likelihood
of impartial evaluation and constitutional adherence.
The foregoing discussion discloses that logic and experience do
not necessarily warrant a presumption of adequate state adherence
to constitutional rights. Simply because the combined social costs of
the exclusionary rule and federal habeas review of state judgments
are disfavored by a majority of the Court is hardly justification for
ignoring the constitutional emphasis of habehs review, the constitutional dimension of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule
whatever procedural inadequacies that still may exist in many state
court systems, and the contrary holding of Kaufman. Certainly, the
availability of federal habeas corpus to state prisoners involves an
ineffcient expenditure of judicial energy and resources. Yet, this and
other equally valid policy concerns should not take precedence over
the vindication of constitutional rights.
THE INTERPRETATION OF "FULL AND FAIR LITIGATION"

Stone v. Powell's refusal to grant federal habeas corpus relief
to state prisoners on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial is prefaced by an important yet ambiguous proviso. Despite disagreement
with the societal effects of federal habeas review and the exclusionary rule, Stone holds that where a state has not provided "an
opportunity for full and fair litigation of a fourth amendment
claim" 2 a state prisoner may still obtain federal relief on that constitutional basis. This exception is important because it furnishes
the only acknowledged means to evade the broad proscription of
Stone. Ascertaining the intended interpretation of the phrase "full
and fair litigation" is, however, tenuous.
Mr. Justice Powell did not elucidate the appropriate meaning
of the expression "full and fair litigation." The only intimation into
the sense of the expression is relegated to a single footnote on the
last page of the majority opinion."2 In the footnote reference is
120.
239 (1969).
121.
122.

Bator, supra note 55, at 453. Cf. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217,
428 U.S. at 482, 494. Cf. 428 U.S. at 480, 494 n.37.
Id. at 494 n.36.
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made to one case, Townsend v. Sain, which is cited as authority
"sufficiently analogous to lend some support to the text."u Unfortunately Stone neglects to explicate the nature of the similarity existing between Townsend and the intended interpretation of "full
and fair litigation."
At least three different interpretations of the phrase in question might be hypothesized in accordance with the provisions of
Townsend. The first interpretaton employs the general meaning of
the term as used in Townsend. The second possible meaning of "full
and fair litigation" recognizes the influence of federalism by limiting
the power of federal district courts to conduct de novo evidentiary
hearings on habeas corpus review of a state judgment. The last interpretation stresses the importance of examining the procedural
adequacy of state court systems on federal habeas corpus in order
to determine whether binding effect should be given the state adjudication of a fourth amendment claim.
Paradoxically, the most unlikely interpretation of "full and fair
litigation" is to ascribe it the same general effect as in Townsend.
The standard formulated for the same expression in that opinion
held that
where the facts are in dispute, the federal court in habeas
corpus must hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas applicant did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing
in a state court, either at the time of the trial or in a collateral proceeding. In other words a federal evidentiary
hearing is required unless the state court trier of fact has
after a full hearing reliably found the relevant facts.124
Taken as a whole, "full and fair" within the context of Townsend referred to the circumstances under which an evidentiary hearing ' n was necessary to resolve disputed facts on federal habeas
review. In order to clarify those instances where an independent factual determination was required, the Court outlined six situations in
which a state adjudication must be deemed as inadequate and hence
an unreliable finding of facts."' This set of circumstances, in turn,
123. A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 7 (12 ed. 1976).
124. 372 U.S. at 312-13.
125. For the purposes of this note, the terms "litigation," "hearing," and "adjudication" within the context of "full and fair" terminology shall be considered
synonomous.
126.
We hold that a federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing to a habeas applicant under the following circumstances: If (1) the
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served as the blueprint for subsection (d) of 28 U.S.C. §2254,11 which
essentially codifies the effect of Townsend. Thus, considering this
merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2)
the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a
whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not
adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full
and fair fact hearing.
372 U.S. at 313.
127.
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court, a determination after a hearing on the merts
of a factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a
proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the State or an officer
or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to
be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State
court hearing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not
adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State
court hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over
the person of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation
of his constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in
the State court proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in
the State court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the
State court proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which
determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual determination, is produced as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on a
consideration of such part of the record as a whole concludes that such
factual determination is not fairly supported by the record:
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court,
when due proof of such factual determination has been made, unless the
existence of one or more of the circumstances respectively set forth in
paragraphs numbered (1) to (7), inclusive, is shown by the applicant otherwise appears, or is admitted by the respondent, or numbered (8) that the
record in the State court proceeding considered as a whole, does not fairly support such factual determination, the burden shall rest upon the applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination
by the State court was erroneous.
28 U.S.C. §2254 (d) (1977).
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broad evidentiary sense of "full and fair" in conjunction with the
earlier decision of Brown v. Allen,1 one may conclude that:
[The] obligation of federal habeas courts, once they
assume jurisdiction, is to assure all state prisoners a full
and fair hearing of their federal claims, and [still] preserve
a meaningful rule for state courts in the adjudication of
federal rights [in order] to minimize tension. With respect
to questions of law, the federal courts have no discretion;
their duty is to redetermine all questions of federal law,
and to order appropriate relief if it appears the state
court incorrectly concluded that no federal right was
violated. With repect to disputes concerning the facts
underlying federal claims, however, while the federal
courts have power to redetermine the facts in all cases, it
is their duty to do so only when the state has failed to
find the facts after a "full and fair" hearing as defined in
Townsend v. Sain.'
These remarks demonstrate that "full and fair" has sometimes been
interpreted as characterizing the entire set of circumstances given
expression in Townsend, which as a whole determine when an
evidentiary hearing is mandatory. In short, the phrase has become
synonymous with the conditional categories formulated in that decision. Subsequent decisions have also regarded the entire criteria of
Townsend as comprising the meaning of the "full and fair" terminology."2 Although such references attest to the reasonableness
of this interpretation, it is unlikely that Stone employs the phrase in
the same sense.
Construing "full and fair litigation" as merely a shorthand notation for the operation of Townsend is not a likely interpretation considering the context of Stone, because its supposed restrictive effect
upon the exclusionary rule would then have no practical impact
upon the viability of fourth amendment claims raised by state
prisoners on federal habeas corpus. Insofar as the evidentiary
128.
129.
130.

344 U.S. 443 (1953).
Wright and Sofaer, supra note 110, at 849 (footnotes omitted).
See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), where the court

held:
If issues are involved, the applicant is entitled to a new hearing upon showing that the evidentiary hearing on the prior application was not full and
fair; we canvassed the criteria of a full and fair evidentiary hearing recently
in Townsend v. Sain, and that discussion need not be repeated here.
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categories devised in Townsend are largely assimilated into 28
U.S.C. §2254 and that statute now governs the availability and scope
of federal habeas review of state convictions, the Stone holding
could never prohibit the granting of habeas relief solely on the basis
of a fourth amendment claim. If the same Townsend standards apply
both to the "full and fair" exception to Stone's application and
§2254, federal habeas review of fourth amendment claims would not
differ from other constitutional objections to a state conviction. In
either case, if a state did not comply with one of the Townsend conditions as embodied in §2254, federal habeas corpus would be
available without restrictions since there is no differentiation between constitutional claims in §2254. In effect, adopting the broad
Townsend interpretation of "full and fair litigation" would make no
difference in the analysis of fourth amendment claims involving the
exclusionary rule on federal habeas review because §2254 controls
the habeas remedy exclusively. This is an unacceptable construction
of the "full and fair" provision for it would either directly contravene §2254 or thwart Stone's express objective of limiting the application of the exclusionary rule.
A more reasonable interpretation of "full and fair litigation"
would be to construe it as a limitation on the power of federal
district courts to conduct de novo evidentiary hearings. The thought
underlying this meaning of the phrase is that once the state court
has completed the initial finding of facts, there is no reason for the
federal court to repeat the same task. This approach would be
especially persuasive if there is no indication of any inadequacy in
the fact-finding procedures utilized by the state court. In this manner, so the proponents of limited federal habeas review assert, a
needless source of friction between the federal and state court
systems would be eliminated and greater levels of cooperation
achieved. Thus, "full and fair" within this context would be interpreted as the finding of facts relevant to a fourth amendment claim
by a state court under evidentiary procedures not so seriously
defective as to violate constitutional due process as a matter of law.
If such reliable facts were found by the state court, then a federal
district court on review of defendant's application for habeas corpus
relief would be precluded from conducting their own evidentiary
hearing.18' The federal court would be forced to rely upon the state
131.
which they
determining
evidentiary

See the very thorough article of Wright and Sofaer, supra note 110, in
analyzed the various situations confronting the federal district court in
whether to accept the state court's findings of fact or to initiate a new
hearing. They concluded:
The federal district court's task under Townsend is to determine
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court's factual determinations, presumably even if unsupported or
contradicted by the trial record.
Although the above interpretation might seem a reasonable
compromise between the protection provided by federal habeas corpus and the values of federalism, there is reason to doubt its application in Stone. If Stone had continued to emphasize the social
necessity of finality of judgment as in Schneckloth v. Bustemonte,1"
then the concept of "full and fair" as a limitation on the availability
of de novo federal hearings would be strengthened. No such emphasis, however, is present in Stone." Of greater significance is the
fact that this interpretation would drastically undercut the liberalized circumstances outlined in Townsend under which a federal
evidentiary hearing is mandated.'" As a result, one would have to
conclude that Mr. Justice Powell mistakenly (or purposely) supported the actual meaning of "full and fair litigation" with precedent
that was largely contrary to such an interpretation. Since such a
conclusion is improbable, this second explanation of the phrase,
although more reasonable than the first, is also doubtful. Any
reasonable interpretation must, at least, bear some analogy to the
whether state courts have made findings of fact upon which the federal
claims of state prisoners can properly be reviewed. In handling this task,
the court's inquiry should not be whether the state court findings are
"correct" in some absolute sense. The district courts should, and Townsend requires generally that they must, direct their attention principally
to the question whether the conditions under which a challenged finding
was made were sufficiently reliable to warrant acceptance of the finding
regardless of its correctness in the absolute sense.
In effect, district courts should search for discernible indicia of
unreliability, rather than engage in the treacherous process of evidence
evaluation. The most significant possible exception to this approach in
Townsend is the requirement that a hearing be held when the facts found
by the state court are not "fairly supported" by the record. This requirement, if broadly interpreted, would entail a full-scale evaluation and
weighing of evidence, tending to relegate state court decision-making to a
substantially meaningless role. As discussed below, the requirement
should therefore be read with a full appreciation of the complexities and
uncertainties inherent in reviewing findings of fact, and of the need to
preserve a meaningful role for the state courts.
IdL
132. 412 U.S. at 256 (Powell, J., concurring).
133. Id at 256-63 (Powell, J., concurring). The only mention of "finality" in
Stone is relegated to a footnote concerning countervailing policy considerations in
resorting to federal habeas corpus, 428 U.S. at 491 n.31. In contrast to Powell's reliance
on the concept in Schneckloth, "finality" performs only a minor role in his analysis in
Stone.
134. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 311-13 (1963).
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rationale of Townsend, because that decision is specifically cited as
support.
The third and most persuasive defination of "full and fair litigation" does not simply reiterate the effect of Townsend, yet still carries some reasonable similarity to that decision. This definition
stresses the significance of procedural adequacy in state court
systems. The essence of this argument is characterized by the
following remarks:
If it be assumed that the habeas court has power to hear
and resolve alleged violations of due process, the argument may still be advanced that due process is not
violated when the state has provided an adequate institutional framework for determining guilt and correcting error. This totality-of-process concept is based upon the
policy that no more should be demanded of the states than
the establishment of adequate processes for the determination of constitutional violations. The habeas court's
inquiry would be limited to determining whether such processes exist and the concept would thus serve the interests of Federalism by requiring deference to all
reasonable state rules ....
The district judge is told to inquire into the adequacy of the state ground-the reasonableness of the
state rule-and no further.'
Such an interpretation of the "full and fair" language certainly comports with Stone's implicit bias toward protection of the integrity
and equality of state judgments. Also implicit within this approach
is the assumption that state courts are for the most part willing and
able to perform the role of watchdog over the constitutional rights
of private citizens.3
135. Sofaer, supra note 117, at 95.
136. The distinction between the second and third interpretations, although
slight, is important and has been essentially characterized in the following remarks.
If the [second] rule was adopted, our prisoner would prove he was being
held in violation of the Constitution as soon as he demonstrated that the
state courts had failed to provide him with a resolution of the actual
dispute underlying his claim of involuntariness; if the [third] rule were
adopted he would have to prove that the failure to render findings of fact
was caused by use of the improper procedure. The role of the federal
courts would be restricted to determining in the first case whether a finding of fact was provided, and in the second case whether the improper
procedure had been utilized.
Wright and Sofaer, supra note 110, at 908 (emphasis added).
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Support for this final alternative meaning can be gleaned from
the categories outlined in Townsend v. Sain. The third guideline set
out in Townsend specifies that a federal evidentiary hearing is required when "the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court
was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing."'3 7 The presence
of "full and fair" terminology in this evidentiary category of Townsend establishes a superficial connection with the expression as used
in Stone." Likewise, the reference to adequacy of state fact-finding
procedures makes it reasonable to presume that the subject matter
of the third Townsend category is not unlike the "totality-of-process
perspective introduced above. The procedural adequacy interpretation of "full and fair litigation" could thus provide a satisfactory explanation for the analogous support that Mr. Justice Powell finds
within Townsend.
In addition, the terms immediately preceding the "full and fair"
language buttress the procedural definition as the only means now
available to gain federal habeas review of a fourth amendment
claim. The full expression reads "that where the State has provided
an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a fourth amendment
claim,"' 8 there is no constitutional necessity to grant federal habeas
relief to a state prisoner asserting infringement of the exclusionary
rule. Note that Stone does not assert that the state must in fact provide a full and fair litigation, rather just an opportunity for such.
The inclusion of the terms "provided an opportunity" are significant,
because they demonstrate that the state court system need not actually consider the defendant's fourth amendment claim in order for
the prohibition of federal habeas relief still to apply. As a result, the
state's only obligation under the Stone rationale is the establishment of a satisfactory procedural framework that will, if utilized,
reliably resolve fourth amendment claims. If such a procedural arrangement does exist within the state, the requisite opportunity has
been provided, and state judgments are then insulated from any
federal collateral attack based upon the admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence. Therefore, the additional terms prefacing
"full and fair litigation" reinforce the "totality-of-process" interpretation." An examination of the factual situations presented in
137. 372 U.S. at 313.
138. The sixth guideline also contains the phrase "full and fair fact-finding."
However this reference simply restates the general Townsend standard without any
additional clarification. Mr. Justice Warren apparently intended it as a catch-all clause.
See 372 U.S. at 317-18.
139. 428 U.S. at 482, 494 & n.37.
140. See note 173 supra and accompanying text.
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Stone and its companion case, Wolff v. Rice,"' also tends to support
the procedural adequacy argument.
The defendant Powell was convicted in state court partially
upon the basis of evidence which had been discovered in a search
pursuant to his violation of a local vagrancy ordinance in another
state. The evidence was admitted by the trial court over his objection to the constitutionality of the vagrancy ordinance. After affirmance by a state appellate court on the basis of harmless constitutional error," 2 the defendant's petition for state habeas corpus relief
was denied by the state supreme court. The defendant then filed application for federal habeas corpus on grounds that the evidence
should have been excluded because it was obtained in an illegal
search. He argued that his arrest was unlawful because the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and therefore any search incident to it invalid. The district court affirmed Powell's conviction on
a variety of bases, but the court of appeals reversed on the constitutional issue finding support for the vagueness contention in an
earlier Supreme Court decision."
The significant aspect in the Supreme Court's review of Stone's
conviction is the lack of any consideration of the merits. Despite the
apparent viability of the vagueness objection to the vagrancy ordinance,'4 the Stone majority was satisfied that the defendant had
been accorded sufficient opportunity to press his constitutional
claim in the state court system. Obviously, the mere fact that a
state court has considered and decided an issue does not in itself attest to the procedural adequacy of the state as a whole. Yet, on the
basis of a trial record, appellate review, and provision for state
habeas corpus relief, one could reasonably infer, as did this Court,
that adequate state procedures did exist for the reliable determination of constitutional claims. Whatever the merits of the defendant's
fourth amendment claim, the state had fulfilled its obligation under
this interpretation of the exception to Stone by maintaining procedures that should be capable of identifying and ultimately
deciding constitutional issues.
The companion case, Wolff v. Rice, exhibits the same provisional support for the "totality-of-process" interpretation. Defendant
141.
142.
143.
471 n.2.
144.

428 U.S. 465 (1976).
See note 63 supra.
Papachristo v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). See 428 U.S. at
1l
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Rice was convicted of murder in a state court on the basis of the implicating testimony of an accomplice and corrobative evidence seized
in a search of defendant's house pursuant to a search warrant. The
state supreme court affirmed the conviction deciding that the warrant had been validly issued. However, upon petition for a writ of
federal habeas corpus, the district court concluded that the evidence
underlying Rice's conviction had been unconstitutionally obtained
because of a defective affidavit in support of the search warrant.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's holding and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Once again, the majority did not
examine the merits of the constitutional controversy surrounding
the validity of the search warrant, but neither did it explicitly consider the adequacy of the state procedures involved. One can only
assume that on the basis of the record the Court found the state
procedures to have provided a fair adjudication of the constitutional
issue. Although the resolution of the factual situations in Stone does
not conclusively support any particular interpretation of "full and
fair litigation," the absence of any treatment of the merits suggests
the compatibility of the "totality-of-process" approach.
The "totality-of-process" interpretaion of "full and fair litigation" still represents a marked departure from the broad availability
of federal habeas corpus relief to state prisoners asserting fourth
amendment claims. No longer will the focus of habeas review center
on the viability of the constitutional issue tendered, but rather on
the procedural protection afforded the prisoner by the state. What
may be most disquieting, if Stone is to be considered the paradigm
for subsequent decisions, is the superficiality of the procedural adequacy necessary to satisfy the requirement of a "full and fair" adjudication. Without discussing the matter, the Stone majority apparently presumed on the basis of the state record and procedural
framework 1 5 that each state had provided a just and impartial adjudication of the constitutional issue. Virtually any state conviction
collaterally attacked by a prisoner on federal habeas corpus could
meet such minimum requirements of due process. If federal habeas
applications by state prisoners asserting fourth amendment infringements are now to be evaluated merely as to whether the trial
court considered the constitutional claim and preserved it for state
appellate review, then the historic power and duty of federal district
courts to ensure individual constitutional rights have been drastically weakened."" Recognition of this fact leads one to query the con145.
146.

See pp. 131-33.
See note 134 supra.
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tinued vitality of Townsend and its evidentiary guidelines for
federal habeas fact-finding.
As the preceding paragraphs have detailed, Stone v. Powell
may have analogized support for its conclusion by elevating the
significance of the procedural adequacy aspect of Townsend. The
fundamental premise implicit throughout all the Townsend
guidelines is the obligation of a federal court on habeas corpus to
breach the state's procedural framework in order to ensure that
relevant facts have been reliably found."' This basic federal responsibility is at odds with the "totality-of-process" perspective, which
would restrict federal habeas review solely to an examination of
whether there are state procedures reasonably calculated to ascertain constitutional violations. Whereas Townsend stressed the
substantive aspect of fact-finding, the "totality-of-process" concept
underscores the existence of typically reliable fact-finding procedures. Hence, the Stone decision could be accurately characterized
as emphasizing formal processes to the exclusion of any independent
federal fact-finding absent a showing of unreasonably inadequate
state procedure. This procedural approach to the scope of federal
habeas review of state convictions seems, therefore, incompatible
with the holding of Townsend, despite the reference to its analogous
support.
Assuming the presence of reasonably adequate procedures,
Stone v. Powell might also require the recognition of a state court's
legal as well as factual conclusions. Nowhere in Stone are legal findings exempted from the deference accorded state adjudications of
fourth amendment claims once the prisoner's "opportunity for a full
and fair litigation" has been established. Thus, a federal court
reviewing a state conviction on habeas corpus might now have to
ratify a state court's legal determinations of fourth amendment
issues despite the misinterpretation of constitutional standards."'
This result again deviates from the holding of Townsend which
remarked upon a prior decision"9 that
[a]lthough the district judge may, where the state court
has reliably found the relevant facts, defer to the state
court's findings of fact, he may not defer to its findings of
147. See notes 126 & 134 supra, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
148. See note 131 supra. Several lower federal courts have in fact decided that
the correct interpretation of constitutional rights at the state level is irrelevant under
the Stone "full and fair" standard. See, e.g., Holmberg v. Parrat, 548 F.2d 745, 746 (8th
Cir. 1977); Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d 452, 455 n.2 (9th Cir. 1976).
149. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
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law. It is the district judge's duty to apply the applicable
federal law to the state court fact-findings independently.
The state conclusions of law may not be given binding
weight on [habeas review] .... "I
The "totality-of-process" approach also seems certain to
abridge the "exhaustion" doctrine as enunciated in Fay v. Noia. One
of the conditions that must be satisfied before a state prisoner can
be granted federal habeas relief is the exhaustion of state
remedies. 51 Noia interpreted this requirement to mean that the
state prisoner must exhaust only those state remedies still presently available to him at the time of application for federal habeas
review.15 Hence, a state prisoner who had inadvertently forfeited a
prior procedural remedy under state law was not barred from obtaining federal relief. The "totality-of-process" interpretation of "full
and fair litigation" in Stone, however,, is only concerned with the
availability of such state procedures. As long as the petitioner has
had the opportunity at any time to adequately present his objection
to the admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence the state
would seem to have fulfilled its obligation under the Stone rationale.
If the state prisoner, therefore, neglected to avail himself of the opportunity to assert the fourth amendment claim at the state level,
he cannot then collaterally attack the state judgment on that constitutional basis in the federal court.1" This forfeiture of federal
relief would follow irrespective of whether additional state remedies
are still presently available. Such a procedural restriction directly
contravenes the purpose of Noia in ensuring that:
[Flederal court jurisdiction is conferred by the allegation
of an unconstitutional restraint and is not defeated by
anything that may occur in the state proceedings. State
procedural rules plainly must yield to this overriding
federal policy."
M

150. 372 U.S. at 318.
151. An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available
in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available
State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such
process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
28 U.S.C. §2254 (b) (1977).
152. 372 U.S. at 434-35.
153. Cf. note 155 supra, which considers the recent case Wainwright v. Sykes,
U.S. 97 S.Ct. 2497 (1977).
154. 372 U.S. at 426. Although Mr. Justice Powell reassures that the Stone
"decision does not mean that the federal court lacks jurisdiction over such a fourth

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol12/iss1/4

et al.: Stone v. Powell: The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, Federal

1977]

STONE V. POWELL

For the same reasons as above, the forfeiture of federal habeas
relief would also occur regardless of whether the defendant
"deliberately bypassed"'
the state procedural ground, as that
waiver requirement was defined in Noia.
From the foregoing analysis, one might be justified in concluding that Fay v. Noia will also no longer be followed by the present Supreme Court. Noia clearly established that "the jurisdiction
of the federal courts on habeas corpus is not affected by procedural
defaults incurred by the applicant during the state court proceedings." ' In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected as unsound,
the suggestion that the federal courts are without power
to grant habeas relief to an applicant whose federal claims
would not be heard on direct review in this court because
of a procedural default furnishing an adequate and independent ground of state decision. 5 '
Stone certainly purports to affect the power of federal courts to
grant habeas relief to state prisoners who assert fourth amendment
claims based on a state's denial of the exclusionary rule. This leads
one to suspect that Stone may be the beginning of an attempt to
amendment claim," 428 U.S. at 495 n.38, it is difficult to reconcile this statement with
the practical result to a habeas applicant. Federal habeas review is immediately blocked upon the showing of an opportunity for a full and fair state hearing even if on the
court's own motion. At least one lower federal court has disputed the jurisdictional
statement of Justice Powell. See O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, 1211 (5th Cir.
1977).
155. After this note was written the Supreme Court decided Wainwright v.
Sykes, - U.S. 97 S.Ct. 2497 (1977), which abolished the "deliberate bypass"
standard for Miranda claims that should be raised at the trial level according to procedural law. In its place the Court substituted the "cause and prejudice" test originally
formulate in Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), and applied in Francis v.
Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976). In order to obtain federal habeas review a state
prisoner must now show cause for his failue to comply with the state contemporaneous
objection rule and actual prejudice resulting from the constitutional violation. What effect Sykes will have on like claims that must be raised at or before the state trial remains to be seen. Also uncertain is the extent to which Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963), survives this recent holding. In any case, Sykes poses another obstacle for the
state prisoner to clear before gaining federal habeas review.
To the extent that the Sykes decision emphasizes the fairness and adequacy of the state contemporaneous objecton rule, it is consistent with the "totality of
process" interpretation although there was no reference in that case to the "full and
fair" standard. Stone v. Powell is unaffected since both petitioners had pressed their
fourth amendment claims at the state level.
156. 372 U.S. at 438.
157. Id at 434.
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resurrect the "adequate and independent state ground" justification
for restricting the scope of federal habeas review as well as federal
direct review.' When considered in conjunction with other recent
decisions regarding the scope of federal habeas corpus, this appears
even, more likely."'
Subsequent Decisions Applying the Stone Rationale
Joint dissatisfaction with both the fourth amendment exclusionary rule and the ongoing availability of federal habeas corpus
for state prisoners is largely confirmed by a subsequent Supreme
Court decision as the most probable motivation underlying the
Stone v. Powell opinion. This reasoning would seemingly inhibit like
restrictions upon other constitutional rights asserted by state
prisoners on federal habeas corpus. Such has been the case so far.
In Brewer v. Williams," the Supreme Court was confronted
with the question whether a state prisoner's fifth and sixth amendment rights on federal habeas review would be similarly conditioned
upon the procedural adequacy afforded him by the state. Considering only the sixth and fourteenth amendment right to counsel, a
bare majority"' of the Court held that incriminating statements
made by the defendant while in transit to the station without the
presence of counsel were unconstitutionally obtained and excludable.
Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, held that,
the right to counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments means at least that a person is entitled to
the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him.'
The Court determined that judicial proceedings had commenced
against the defendant prior to the statements on the basis of the
warrant for his arrest, arraignment, and confinement in jail. The majority opinion also found no waiver of his right to assistance of

158. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, - U.S.
..
97 S.Ct. 2497, 2503-509
(1977). For an excellant discussion as to how the "full and fair" standard relates to the
adequate and independent state ground, see O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204,
1216-18 (5th Cir. 1977).
159. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes,
- U.S.
-,
97 S.Ct. 2497 (1977);
Frances v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
160. U.S. -,
97 S.Ct. 1232 (1977).
161. Four members of the Court, Mr. Chief Justice Burger, Mr. Justice White,
Mr. Justice Blackman, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist dissented to the majority opinion.
162.
- U.S. -,
97 S.Ct. 1232, 1239 (1977).
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counsel. The Brewer decision thus appears to resist any further expansion of the Stone argument.
Although Mr. Justice Powell, author of the Stone decision,
formed part of the majority in Brewer, he wrote a concurring opinion in which he expressed his thoughts on the applicability of the
Stone rationale to other constitutional rights. Alluding to consideration of "the integrity of the fact-finding process,"'8 3 which did not
play a large part in the Stone decision,'" Justice Powell preferred
not to venture an opinion at this early stage. He may, therefore, still
represent the swing vote in future cases which confront the further
extension of the Stone argument-a fact which did not escape the
65
attention of the Brewer dissenters.'
At any rate, like excursions into the applicability of other constitutional rights on federal habeas review of state convictions will
probably turn more upon dissatisfaction with the particular right involved than upon the interest of federalism, which continues to exert dominant influence in recent decisions.'" Whereas comity and
federalism remain constants in the consideration of any federal
habeas petition, constitutional rights are presumably variables
distinguishable according to the social costs which each incurs.
Those rights which on balance approach or surpass the level of
social disadvantage engendered by the fourth amendment are most
threatened by the Stone rationale.' 7 The Brewer Court's refusal to
consider the petitioner's fifth amendment claim leaves the door to
further restrictions on federal habeas corpus slightly ajar.
Perhaps of greater importance is the impact of Stone upon
lower federal courts, which remain the real battlegrounds of federal
habeas review. Inasmuch as the Supreme Court has removed fourth
amendment claims from consideration if the forum state has provided an opportunity for a full and fair hearing, most federal court decisions have understandably centered on whether such was afforded
163. Id at 1247 (Powell, J., concurring).
164. The only portion of the Stone majority opinion to consider "the integrity
of the fact-finding process" is in reference to Mr. Justice Black's dissent to the Kaufman decision, see 428 U.S. at 490. There was greater emphasis upon the truth finding
process in Mr. Justice Powell's concurrence to Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at
250.
165. __
U.S. __,
97 S.Ct. 1232, 1254 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
166. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, U.S. -,
97 S.Ct. 2497 (1977);
Juidice v. Vail, __
U.S.
, 97 S.Ct. 1211 (1977).
167. For possible examples of such constitutional rights, see 428 U.S. at 517-18
and the text accompanying notes 174-77 infra.
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the state prisoner. Unfortunately, few federal district or circuit
courts have adequately analyzed the concept before application." 8
Rather most have either presumed the Townsend criteria still to be
the standards by which to evaluate the adequacy of state convictions or unquestionably accepted the state record as conclusive of
the fact." 9 Fewer still have elaborated on what constitutes denial of
the right to a full and fair hearing at the state level. 7 '
Most lower federal courts have quite naturally utilized the
Stone standard as a means to avoid any consideration of fourth
amendment claims on federal habeas review of state convictions.''
168. At the present time only one lower federal court has fully analyzed the
"full and fair" standard, O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1977).
169. The following cases have applied the Townsend criteria to the interpretation of the "full and fair" standard: Hines v. Auger, 550 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1977); Nordskog v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1977); Curry v. Garrison, 423 F.Supp. 109 (W.
D.N.C. 1976).
Cases which examined the state record in order to evaluate the adequacy
of the state proceedings without reference to the Townsend criteria include: Kahn v.
Flood, 550 F.2d 784 (2nd Cir. 1977); Cole v. Estelle, 548 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1977);
Holmberg v. Parratt, 548 F.2d 745 (8th Cir. 1977); Talavera v. Wainwright, 547 F.2d
1238 (5th Cir. 1977); Stocker v. Hutto, 547 F.2d 437 (8th Cir. 1977); Nordskog v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1977); Stinson v. State of Alabama, 545 F.2d 485 (5th Cir.
1977); Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1976); Williams v. State of Ohio,
547 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1976); United States ex. rel. Placek v. State of Illinois, 546 F.2d
1298 (7th Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Saiken v. Bensinger, 546 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir.
1976); Marchese v. State of California, 545 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1976); Flood v. State of
Louisiana, 545 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1976); Chavez v. Rodriquez, 540 F.2d 500 (10th Cir.
1976); George v. Blackwell, 537 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1976); Wright v. Wainwright, 537
F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Williams v. State of Delaware, 427
F.Supp. 72 (D. Dela. 1976); United States ex rel. Conray v. Bombard, 426 F.Supp. 97
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Hughes v. State of California, 426 F.Supp. 36 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Bellew
v. Gunn, 424 F.Supp. 31 (N.D. Calif. 1976); United States ex rel. Tirado v. Bombard,
423 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D.N.Y. 1976); Palmer v. Zahradnick, 423 F.Supp. 130 Va.
1976); Richardson v. Stone, 421 F.Supp. 577 (N. D. Calif. 1976); Perry v. Vincent, 420
F.Supp. 1351 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Losinno v. Henderson, 420 F.Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
170. See Curry v. Garrison, 423 F.Supp. 109 (W.D.N.C. 1976); United States ex
rel. Petillo v. State of New Jersey, 418 F.Supp. 686 (D.N.J. 1976).
171. See Hines v. Auger, 550 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1977); Kahn v. Flood, 550 F.2d
784 (2nd Cir. 1977); Cole v. Estelle, 548 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1977); Holmberg v. Parratt,
548 F.2d 745 (8th Cir. 1977); Talavera v. Wainwright, 547 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1977);
Stocker v. Hutto, 547 F.2d 437 (8th Cir. 1977); O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204
(5th Cir. 1977); Nordskog v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1977); Stinson v. State of
Alabama, 545 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1977); Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d 452 (9th Cir.
1976); Williams v. States of Ohio, 547 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1976); United States ex rel.
Placek v. State of Illinois, 546 F.2d 1298 (7th Cir. 1976); Marchese v. State of California, 545 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1976); Flood v. State of Louisiana, 545 F.2d 485 (5th Cir.
1976); Rigsbee v. Parkinson, 545 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1976); Corley v. Cardwill, 544 F.2d
349 (9th Cir. 1976); Redford v. Smith, 543 F.2d 726 (10th Cir. 1976); White v. State of
Alabama, 541 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1976)(remanded); Roach v. Parratt, 541 F.2d 772 (8th
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In this sense, the decision has accomplished its objective of minimizing federal review of fourth amendment claims. Yet, many of these
same courts now devote as much or even greater consideration to
the question of whether the forum state has "provided an opportuni'
Thus, the time and energy that
ty for a full and fair hearing."172
might have previously been spent in evaluating the merits of a
habeas petitioner's claim is now concentrated exclusively on the adequacy of the corrective processes provided by the state. A few decisions have recognized the impact of the opportunity aspect of the
Stone formula and have held that even erroneous findings of the
state court are immaterial and do not necessarily require federal
review.771 Most federal courts, however, have continued to evaluate
the adjudicative history of each applicant so as to determine
whether the full and fair standard has actually been met.
There has also been less reluctance on the part of district
courts to extend the Stone rationale to additional constitutional
claims. Citing Stone as persuasive authority, several decisions have
applied a similar social cost-benefit analysis to exclude from federal
habeas review of state convictions claims such as questionable identification procedures under the fourteenth amendment, 174 Miranda
violations,1 75 and illegal wiretapping. 76 At least three courts,

Cir. 1976); Bracco v. Reed, 540 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1976); Cayer v. State of Alabama,
537 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1976) (remanded); Wright v. Wainwright, 537 F.2d 224 (5th Cir.
1976); George v. Blackwell, 537 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Williams
v. State of Delaware, 427 F.Supp. 72 (D. Dela. 1976); United States ex rel. Conray v.
Bombard, 426 F.Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Hughes v. State of California, 426 F.Supp. 36
(W.D. Okla. 1976); Bellew v. Gunn, 424 F.Supp. 31 (N.D. Calif. 1976); United States ex
rel. Tirado v. Bombard, 423 F.Supp. 1245 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Palmer v. Zahradnick, 423
F.Supp. 130 (E.D. Va. 1976); Richardson v. Stone, 421 F.Supp. 577 (N.D. Calif. 1976);
Denti v. Commissioner of Correctional Services, 421 F.Supp. 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Perry
v. Vincent, 420 F.Supp. 1351 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Losinno v. Henderson, 420 F. Supp. 380
(S.D.N.Y. 1076); Pulver v. Cunningham, 419 F.Supp. 1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
172. See, e.g., O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1977); United
States ex rel. Conray v. Bombard, 426 F.Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
173. The following cases are in accord with the "totality-of-process" interpretation of the full and fair standard inasmuch as they emphasize the opportunity aspect of
the state proceedings: Hines v. Auger, 550 F.2d 1094, 1097 (8th Cir. 1977); Holmberg v.
Parratt, 548 F.2d 745, 746 (8th Cir. 1977); O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204,
1213-14 (5th Cir. 1977); Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d 452, 455 n.2 (9th Cir. 1976);
Denti v. Commissioner of Correctional Services, 421 F.Supp. 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Pulver v. Cunningham, 419 F.Supp. 1221, 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
174. Szaraz v. Perini, 422 F.Supp. 8 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
175. Richardson v. Stone, 421 F.Supp. 577 (N.D. Calif. 1976).
176. United States ex rel. Conray v. Bombard, 426 F.Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Zagarino v. West, 422 F.Supp. 812 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
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however, have refused to expand Stone to allegations of double
jeopardy.1"
CONCLUSION

In Stone v. Powell a majority of the Supreme Court brought
federal habeas review of state convictions into line with the principles of federalism, comity, and abstention that have influenced
many other recent decisions. In so doing it ignored the historic
justifications of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule in favor of
the questionable deterrent function of the rule. The "full and fair
hearing" standard that was announced in Stone as the limiting factor to obtaining federal habeas review seems destined as yet
another vague and ambiguous notion upon which various courts can
place differing or even contradictory interpretations. For this
reason, the "full and fair" concept is a poor standard by which to
evaluate when deference to state findings is required. If the Townsend criteria are presumed dispositive of the Stone standard, as
many federal decisions have subsequently held, then fourth amendment claims are still subject to the same habeas review as other
constitutional claims under §2254. Since such a result is clearly contrary to Mr. Justice Powell's stated objective in Stone of limiting
review of fourth amendment claims, a more likely interpretation
would place greater emphasis upon the procedural adequacy of the
forum state. Under the "totality-of-process" approach, which has
been affirmed by several federal courts as the appropriate interpretation of "full and fair," it is clear that a state prisoner no longer
has a right to have his fourth amendment claim decided correctly,
but rather only the right to have an opportunity to present it before
a state tribunal.

177. See Greene v. Masser, 546 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1977); Corley v. Cardwell, 544
F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1976); Sedgwick v. Superior Court of Dist. of Columbia, 417 F.Supp.
386 (D.D.C. 1976).
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